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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to analyze the problematic nature of 
Canada's defence policy by utilizing general systems theory as the 
prime method of inquiry. While much of the existing literature on 
Canadian defence policy is of a singular or partial nature, there 
is a need for a more holistic approach to the study of defence policy. 
General systems theory, being a normative theory with a 
scientific base, assumes a holistic approach while offering explan-
ations in behavioural phenomena as well as indicating possible future 
conditions. 
This thesis examines the past and present of Canadian defence 
policy as seen in the perspective of ever-changing political, 
strategic and military conditions prevailing in the international 
systems environment. In a developmental sense, this analysis should 
be regarded as an ongoing process whereby a general theory has been 
utilized to explain and interpret existing data in such a way as to 
arrive at a new synthesis in the search for human knowledge. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Scope and Method of Inquiry 
General Statement: 
Canada's defence policy has shown itself to be problematic in 
nature as indicated by a long line of crisis situations that have 
occurred throughout the years. At present, no available inquiry on 
Canadian defence policy has utilized any particular scientific method 
to perform the dual functions of both explanation and recommendation. 
General systems theory is one particular scientific method of inquiry 
that enables the inquirer to make certain normative statements of 
recommendation while still obeying the demands of scientific analysis. 
The use of general systems theory to study the problematic nature of 
Canadian defence policy places the singular problem of defence in its 
broadest of all possible perspectives. 
(1) An Analysis of The Problem 
The first stage of any political inquiry is to observe those 
relevant facts that indicate that there is a problem worthy of such 
an inquiry. Secondly, relevant hypotheses should be drawn from the 
analysis of those facts which indicate the problem. 
F. S. Northrop, The Logic of The Sciences and The Humanities, Cleveland; The 
World Publishing Co., 1947, p. 29. 
2. 
But what is it that makes a problem appear as requiring further 
inquiry? Philosopher John Dewey considered a problem to be a problem 
2 
at the point that it was recognized as such. Although Dewey con-
firmed that problem perception begins on a highly subjective level, 
inquiry begins when the individual observer finds something to be un-
satisfactory. Inquiry can result from a physical experience or the 
acquisition of new information that makes traditional values and beliefs 
3 inadequate or places those values and beliefs in question. Therefore 
having a problem is the first and necessary step in any inquiry. For 
without a problem, there is no need to carry out such an inquiry. 
Once a problem has been recognized as a 'problematic situation', 
it must be reduced to those relevant facts that gave rise to the problem 
4 
in the first place. What this infers is a comprehensive description 
of those relevant facts that would indicate to the outside observer that 
a problem does indeed exist. In the political inquiry being attempted 
in this thesis, there are certain relevant facts that will be stated to 
indicate that Canada's defence policy is a problematic situation worthy 
of further inquiry. 
There are certain documented case situations and relevant facts 
which indicate the problematic nature of Canada's defence policy. 
During the Cuban missile crisis in late 1962, Canada found her 
2 
John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 
Publishing Company, 1938, p. 108. 
3 
F. S. Northrop, Op. cit., p. 17. 
Ibid., p. 34. 
defence policy to be 'futile and unequal to an emergency situation'. 
For example, Canada's armed forces were put on national alert a full 
forty-eight hours after the United States had placed its military 
forces on full national alert. Throughout the whole crisis situation, 
Canadian Bomarc missiles without nuclear warheads, remained on the 
ground virtually useless for any counter-offensive strategy. As a 
result, Canada's defence against a Soviet nuclear attack relied solely 
on the reliability of the United States' massive second strike capability, 
namely its ICBM's and its missile launching submarines to counter this 
7 
threat. 
This dependence on the United States offensive capability corres-
ponds with the generally held belief that the United States is geogra-
phically committed to the defence of Canada. Although there is a 
certain amount of logic in this belief, there is an equal amount 
of scepticism surrounding any such obvious truism. Since the early 
sixties, significant advances in weapons technology have placed in 
question those strategic arguments surrounding the long-range bomber 
as the chief weapon. These changes in weapons technology and resultant 
R. Reford, Canada and Three Crises, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1968, p. 3. 
6 
Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963, Vol. XII, Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1968, p. 45. 
7 
Lieutenant General E. M. Burns, Defence in The Nuclear Age: An Introduction 
For Canadians, Toronto: Clarke Irwin Publishing Co., 1976, p. 116. 
Q 
General R. J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation" in Inter-
national Journal (C11A) Vol. XVII, 1961/62. p. 217 
It is interesting to note that General Sutherland's remarks were made prior to 
the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962. 
4. 
strategies have played havoc with the Department of National Defence in 
its attempt to find an all-purpose weapon to substitute for the lack 
9 
of a sound long range defence policy. 
Secondly, Canadian defence policy and other related issues have 
precipitated a series of major political crises throughout Canadian 
history. The conscription crises of 1917 and 1944, the controversial 
NORAD debate of 1957, the cancellation of the Avro-Arrow project in 
1958 and the moral dilemma surrounding the nuclear weapons debate of 
the early sixties constitute the type of crises that have sprung from 
Canada's defence policy. Both the nature of these crises and the 
frequency with which they occurred would seem to indicate that further 
inquiry into the whole area of national defence is warranted. 
Furthermore, there exists a general sense of confusion over 
what role Canada's defence policy should fulfil in terms of her foreign 
policy. Repeatedly, Canadian political decision makers have stated 
unequivocally that Canada's defence policy is 'derived directly from 
10 
her foreign policy'. Although this position would seem to represent 
what various Canadian governments intend to be the ideal, the past 
John Sheltus, Toronto Star Magazine, Saturday, August 14, 1977, p. 12. 
Since unification of the Canadian armed forces in 1964, the Canadian 
government has religiously pursued weapons buying with cost effectiveness 
being the most influential factor in determining weapons choices. As a 
result, Canada's weapons arsenal offers limited supportive capability to its 
defensive obligations abroad. For example, the 'new' German Leopard I tank 
purchased by the Canadian government has become virtually obsolete before 
it could realize any appreciable use in the field. The CF-104 Starfighter 
was purchased in the early sixties with the purpose of fulfilling Canada's 
nuclear role in NATO but has required expensive moderation to match the 
governments desire to go non-nuclear in 1972. 
The Honourable George Pearkes, Minister of National Defence, April 
1959, as quoted in R. Reford's "Making Defence Policy in Canada" in Behind 
The Headlines, Vol. XXIII (December, 1963), p. 15. 
record has shown that the ideal has seldom corresponded to reality. 
NATO had in reality determined all of our defence 
policy. We had no defence policy, so to speak, 
except that of NATO. And our defence policy had 
determined all of our foreign policy. And we had 
no foreign policy of any importance except that 
which flowed from NATO... It is a false perspective 
to have a military alliance determine your foreign 
policy. It should be your foreign policy which 
determines your military policy."-^ 
As a result of the confusion surrounding this whole relationship 
between Canada's defence policy and her foreign policy, there is a 
further problem of 'priorities' involved when two groups compete for 
12 
the same resources. If the government perceives defence policy as 
flowing from foreign policy, then Canada's defence needs are 
channelled through foreign policy objectives which tend by their very 
nature to be 'ill-defined and capable of systematic expression only 
13 in terms of generalities.' 
Defence policy, unlike foreign policy, must be expressed in more 
precise terms as to be operational on a daily basis while foreign 
policy can assume more long range objectives. In this sense, Canada's 
defence policy and foreign policy have grown so far apart from each other 
as to be counter productive in their respective efforts to accomplish 
11 
The Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, Statements 
and Speeches, Ottawa: Oueen's Printer, April 12, 1969, p. 4. 
12 
Denis Stairs, "The Military as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy" 
in H. Massey (ed.), The Canadian Military: A Profile, Toronto: Copp-Clarke 
Publishing Company, 1972, p. 91. 
13Ibid, p. 87 
similar objectives. 
Much of the research that has been done on Canada's defence policy 
has only partially succeeded in doing what is required for a truly 
scientific inquiry. The mere observation of the relevant facts surroun-
ding any problem does not necessarily infer solutions to that problem. 
"The purpose of defence policy analysis as of 
all science, is to generate accurate predic-
tions i.e. estimates of what will happen in 
the future based on characteristics of the 
present and past."15 
Since many of the observations on Canadian defence policy span 
so many areas with such complexity, some theoretical framework is 
required to give these observations meaning. It is at this point in 
the inquiry that the application of theory and related hypotheses can 
play a significant part in furthering analysis. For 'theoretically 
inferred knowledge' is as essential to the process of inquiry as 
'immediately apprehended knowledge'. 
(2) The Use of Theory 
Once a factual analysis of the problem has been completed by 
a description of the relevant facts, the problem may still remain un-
resolved. It becomes apparent that something beyond the mere observation 
Andrew Brewin, Stand On Guard: The Search For a Canadian Defence Policy, 
Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Publishing Company, 1965, p. 118. 
15 
Davis Bobrow, The Components of Defence Policy, Chicago: Rand McNally 
Publishing Company, 1965, p. 2. 
F. S. Northrop, Op cit., p. 39. 
of facts must be introduced into the inquiry. Most problems that are 
subjected to inquiry suggest certain explanations or solutions based 
upon the subject matter and the previous knowledge available to the 
inquirer. When these suggested explanations are translated into 
17 propositions, they are referred to as hypotheses. 
The introduction of concepts and hypotheses can bring order 
to a large collection of relevant facts but theorizing through the 
use of hypotheses can result in aimless wandering unless the systema-
1 8 
tic demands of scientific method are imposed upon the inquiry. 
The application of scientific method to any inquiry infers that 
certain facts are selected as relevant while other facts are excluded 
as being irrelevant. A continuous buildup of knowledge occurs through-
out this process of moving from facts to theory to principle to new 
19 facts, new theories and new principles. At each level of inquiry, 
a new theory based upon a broader interconnection of the facts will 
be drawn upon until the widest possible connection of the facts has 
been achieved. 
The use of theory can be significant in developing human knowledge. 
The ideal type of theory, if any 'ideal' type could be found, would be 
capable of attaining the highest level of inquiry by connecting 
all the relevant facts while being firmly grounded in the 
M. R. Cohen, E. Nagel, An Introduction To Logic and Scientific Method, 
New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1934, pp. 200-201. 
18Ibid, p. 394. 
Ibid, p. 396. 
pure sciences. However, the pure sciences restrict themselves to di-
rectly observable entities and relations thus becoming descriptive and 
20 incapable of making predictions. 
It is scientific theory that speculates about facts 
and their relationships with each other while the pure sciences remain 
chained to observing the invariant relationships between objects. 
"A scientific theory defines phenomena and 
their relations through a set of propositions 
organized in a deductive logical form, from 
which are deduced general statements which 
assert that, given specific conditions and „.. 
relationships, specific conclusions will ensue." 
However, most types of scientific theory are limited in both their 
scope and method of inquiry. The 'physical' scientific theories are 
confined to the mechanistic explanation of observable phenomena no matter 
22 how complex such a mechanism may be. The abstract or 'mathematical' 
scientific theories attempt to draw out general principles by abstracting 
23 
relations from the observable facts. 
In the area of political inquiry, many of the scientific theories 
that are empirically based tend to be partial theories that converge on 
some central point, each specifying one of the factors which plays a part 
20 
F. S. Northrop, Op cit., p. 115. 
21 
Charles Reynolds, Theory and Explanation in International Politics, New 
York: Barnes and Noble Publishers, 1973, p. 322. 
22 
M. Cohen, E. Nagel, Op cit., p. 398 
23 
Ibid, p. 397 
9. 
24 in the phenomenon which the theory is to explain. Partial theories 
can be important for increasing human knowledge in the summative sense 
but they are found to be lacking in adding to our constituent knowledge 
of things and how they relate to each other as a whole. Also, there is 
limited understanding of what relationship these partial theories have 
25 
with each other. 
What is needed in the field of political inquiry is the develop-
ment of a general theory which would span all aspects of the inquiry 
while still explaining the specifics of the problem at hand, Canada's 
defence policy is one such problem area that could be more fully under-
stood if its singular generalizations were interpreted in terms of 
26 how political systems function in their entirety. 
It is in this context of developing a general theory that general 
24 
A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology For Behaviorial Science, 
San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964, p. 298. 
For example, the decision-making approach as developed by R. Snyder, H. 
Bruck and B. Sapin in their book, Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach 
To The Study of International Politics, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 
1962, confines itself to one central process that occurs within the political 
system, namely decision-making (i.e. voting, legislating, administrating and 
adjudicating). The authors argue that there is not enough 'empirical data 
and preliminary conceptualization' to provide the basis for a general theory 
of international politics. It would seem to be their view that if enough 
partial theories could be developed to fill those gaps in human knowledge, 
then some type of general theory could be realized. This point of view is 
logical in the sense that most human knowledge has been derived from the 
building of new theories and hypotheses on top of older established theories 
and hypotheses. For further reference see ibid., pp. 25-26. 
25 
David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York: John Wiley 
and Sons Publishing Company, 1965, p. 8, 
Ibid., p. 8. 
systems theory is used in this thesis to study the problematic nature 
of Canadian defence policy. 
(3) General Systems Theory as a Method of Inquiry 
General systems theory is a normative theory with a scientific 
27 base. It performs both an explanatory role as demanded by the pure 
sciences and makes predictions based upon an analysis of the 
observable facts. It qualifies as a general theory in that the range 
of its subject matter varies from the specific to the all inclusive 
while maintaining a high degree of consistency among its component 
28 parts. 
But, an important distinction must be made between systems 
theory as developed by David Easton and general systems theory 
as developed by the biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy. Systems theory inf 
'a conceptual scheme, a state of mind or general orientation which 
29 
serves as a jumping off place for more specialized political research'. 
27 
Anatol Rapoport "Various Meanings of Theory" in J. Rosenau Interna-
tional Politics and Foreign Policy (3rd ed.), New York: Free Press 
Publishing Co., 1961, p. 51, General systems is normative in the sense 
that the basic inherent value of survival is superimposed as the 'true 
finality' of every open living system. All behaviour is explainable 
in terms of this 'true finality'. 
28 
David Easton, Op cit., p. 7. 
29 
A. Isaak, Scope and Method of Political Science: An Introduction To 
The Methodology of Political Inquiry, Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press 
Limited, 1969, p, 220. 
System theorists like Easton do not base their conceptualization of 
'the system' on any established scientific base. 
General systems theory on the other hand, is deeply rooted in 
the l i f e sciences as indicated by von Bertalanffy's extensive 
30 
observations of nature with his work in biology. From these obser-
vations in biology, von Bertalanffy found that there are certain 
general phenomena that all living systems hold in common with each 
other. The principle governing these phenomena is referred to as 
1 • 3 1 isomorphism. 
There are approximately twelve recognizable isomorphic charac-
teristics that re-occur in various living organisms regardless of 
their level of existence or complexity. These twelve isomorphic cha^ 
racteristics are the following: 
(a) Progressive Differentiation - a movement from a more general 
and homeogeneous state to a more specialized and heterogeneous 
,. - 32 
condition of existence. 
(b) Progressive Segregation - the system passes from a state of whol 




Von Bertalanffy draws some interesting parallels between certain re-
curring phenomenon in nature and the view of 'life' as a 'system property' 
in his earlier work Modern Theories of Development: An Introduction To 
Theoretical Biology translated by J. H. Woodger, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1933. 
31 
L.Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development 
Applications (revised edition), New York: George Braziller Publishing Co. 
1968, p. 81.' 
32 
Ibid., p. 211. 
33 
Ibid., p. 68 
12. 
(c) Progressive Centralization and Progressive Individualization 
These two characteristics are combined because neither one 
can occur without the other. Progressive individualization is 
only possible if certain dominant parts in the system assume 
a dominant role and determine the behaviour of the whole. 
. . . 34 This constitutes progressive centralization. 
(d) Progressive Mechanization - 'The transition from undifferentiated 
wholeness to higher function, made possible by specialization 
35 
and a division of labour'. 
(e) Competition Between Parts - The concept of competition is tied 
in closely with another isomorphic characteristic,growth. All 
open living systems having varying growth rates, experience 
competition for available resources among their own species 
as well as within themselves. 
(f) Domination of Parts - As the individual component parts of 
the system become more sophisticated in structure, they be-
come progressively Individualized because a few select parts 
37 tend to dominate the whole. 
34 
Ibid., p. 73. 
35 
Ibid., p. 213. 
36Ibid., p. 65, 
37 
Ibid., p. 73. 
(g) Entropy - Negentropy 
Entropy represents 'a constant and ongoing tendency within 
all open systems to move towards maximum disorder and break-
A - 3 8 
down . 
Negentropy is the opposing tendency within every open system 
that moves the system towards maximum order thus maintaining 
the system, 
(h) Initial Conditions - Final Outcomes 
This isomorphic characteristic applies only to the higher 
class of open systems that display a dynamic teleology or 
39 directiveness of processes. 
Lower level systems with static structures have their final 
outcomes determined by their structure. However, the higher 
systems in nature's hierarchy with a certain level of aware-
ness have the capability of having their behaviour determined 
by foresight of the goal. Initial conditions may influence 
behaviour but final outcomes are determined by the foresight 
40 
of that final outcome. 
(i) Catabolic and Anabolic Rates of Reaction 
The concepts of catabolism and anabolism are closely•associated 
with the transmission of entropy between the open system and 
38Ibid., p. 39. 
39 
Ibid., p. 78. 
its external and internal environments. The catabolic rate 
of reaction within every open system refers to the capability 
of the organism to channel energy into directions that promote 
maximum disorder. External threats to the system increases 
catabolism within the system. The anabolic rate of reaction 
counters the catabolic tendency within the system by channel-
ling the available energy in directions that promote every 
41 
open system's true finality, namely, its continued survival. 
(j) System Maintenance 
Every open living system is constantly exchanging energy with 
its external and internal environments. Each system is 'self 
regulating in the sense of maintaining certain variables and 
42 directing the organism towards a desired goal.' Certain 
regulators exist within every open system, be they of a natural 
or artificial nature, that move the system toward equilibrium 
or a steady state condition. In chemistry and biology, the 
overall process which maintains the material and energy ac-
tivities at a constant level is referred to as homeostasis. 
(k) Growth and Development 
It has been established in every scientific and social 
41 
N. Nyiri, Alternatives To Nuclear Warfare; A Possible Role for Canada in 
US/USSR Nuclear Balance, Volume #1, Occasional paper #2, Waterloo, Ontario, 
Waterloo Lutheran University, August 1971, pp. 25-26. 
42 
Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op cit., p. 161. 
^
3Ibid., p. 78. 
discipline that growth is 'a component process in development'. 
A recognition that these isomorphic characteristics are present 
in all systems implies that these systems are purposeful and 
goal directed. 
(1) Finalities and Equifinalities 
Within all living open systems, the parts are arranged in such 
a fashion as to indicate a 'certain purpose'. 
Even static structures have a directiveness based upon their 
structural arrangements. Sophisticated open systems have a 
true finality or purposiveness whereby a system's behaviour 
46 is determined by the foresight of the goal being sought. 
The true finality of every open system is to ensure its con-
tinued survival although man's symbolic systems may super-
impose new and complex finalities on top of this basic goal 
of survival. 
Also, all living open systems are capable of reaching the 
same final position from different initial conditions at 
different times in different ways. This process is referred 
to as equifmality. 
44 
Refer to L. Von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development . . . . 
Op cit., p. 158 
45 
Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op cit., p. 77. 
46 
Ibid., p. 79. 
47 
Ibid., p. 79. 
All of these isomorphic characteristics are highly interrelated 
to each other and can be observed to some appreciable degree in every 
open system. However, the selection of general phenomena that are 
held in common by all living organisms by itself is only one more 
partial theory, unless these twelve isomorphic characteristics are 
placed into proper perspective. 
The second principle that sets general systems theory apart from 
other scientific theories of inquiry is the concept of organization 
48 
which gives all life meaning. No living substance exists in isolation. 
Every open system exchanges energy with both its internal and external 
environments. The concept of organization in all organisms specifies 
the internal relations of events which constitute the organism as well 
as setting up the external relations of that organism to other organisms 
49 in its environment. 
The existence of organization has created a necessity for hierarchy 
to establish 'a division of labour', increase specialization and thus 
make growth and development possible. Every conceivable organism from 
the smallest and most simplified to the largest and most complex can 
be classified in nature's hierarchy of systems. The following table 
(Table 1) indicates the inclusiveness of systems and the way in which 
systems have developed in complexity. 
Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
Table I 
Nature's Hierarchy of Systems 
1/ Static structures 
(frameworks) 
2/ Clockworks 
atoms, molecules and 
crystalline structures 
clocks, conventional 
machines (i.e. pulley, 
lever) solar system 
50 
final outcomes are determined 
only by structure. (There is 
no exchange of energy with en-
vironment) 
each part of system possesses 
a certain degree of probability 
but final outcomes are still de-
termined by structure 
3/ Control mechanisms 
(thermostat) 
thermostat, servo- - increased probability and free-
mechanisms, homeostatic dom of action for individual 
mechanism in organisms parts but structure still determi' 
final outcomes 
4/ Open systems flame, cells and or-
ganism in general 
First time that initial condition 
(structure) do not necessarily de 
termine final outcomes 
5/ Lower organisms "plant-like organisms" 
increased differentia-
tion of systems (a di-
vision of labour) 
individual organism (phenotype) 
begins to visibly differentiate 
itself from its genus type 
6/ Animals information systems de-- individual animal can behave in 
velop learning capabili- a manner that differs from its 
ty, a small degree of class of species but seldom does 
consciousness exists 
7/ Man 
5/ S o c i o - c u l t u r a l 
systems 
9/ Symbolic systems 
symbolism; man has a 
past, present and a 
future; communication 
by language 
man's initial conditions do not 
determine the final outcome -
Foresight of goal determines 
final outcome 
symbol determined com- - increased knowledge infers in-
munities such as nation creased individual freedom 
state system and inter-
national system 
Language, Logic, Arts 
and the sciences 
The power to 'abstract' gives man 
the freedom to deny the natural 
system and its biological restrair 
but he cannot reject the natural 
system. (To reject the natural 
system is to reject organization 
which is the essence of life) 
The symbolic system unlike the natural system imposes 
no restraints on man's ability to act. Therefore, man 
is capable of acting either responsibly or irresponsibly 
in regards to the demands of the natural system. 
50 
Table I elaborates on Boulding's informal survey of The Main Levels in the 
Hierarchy of Systems in L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . 
Op cit., pp. 28-29 
18. 
Every system and sub-system in nature's hierarchy interacts with 
its particular environment. As a result of this interaction, there is 
a natural competition between systems to acquire the necessary life-giving 
forces to ensure survival and maintain growth and development. 
"Competition eventually leads to the extermination 
of the species with the smaller growth capacity. 
. . . Every whole is based upon the competition 
of its elements and presupposes the struggle be-
tween the parts. 
This competition between systems results in a type of conflict that 
is both entropic and negentropic in effect. For example, the continued 
survival of one organism can be dependent upon the destruction of another 
organism of a different species or of the same class of species. This 
situation is entropy creating in moving that particular species to-
wards extinction. However, this same situation is also a positive 
growth force that improves the class of species through the process of 
natural selection whereby individual organisms of the species become 
more adaptive and well integrated through time. 
The true finality of every open living system is survival, main-
52 
taining itself and its identity. In light of this, all defensive 
activities occurring within the system are directly supportive of the 
Ibid., p. 66 
52 
A. Rapoport, Conflict in Man-Made Environment, Middlesex, England; 
Penguin Books Ltd., 1974, p. 17, The concept of survival infers much more 
than the system attempting to attain a steady state condition. Growth 
and development are essential components to system survival. The re-
gulating activity attempting to bring all systems to a steady state con-
dition compliments the overall evolution of the organism to a higher level 
of existence and complexity. Von Bertalanffy refers to this ongoing move-
ment as one leading to maximum effect with minimum effort. Refer to General 
Systems Theory . . . Op cit., p. 75. 
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system's true finality, survival. 
"The defensive mechanism of each system ensures 
the survival of each open system which manifests 
itself through conflict and destructive be-
haviour" ."" 
In man's social systems such as the nation state system, defence is 
as primary a function as it is in all natural systems. 
However, man,unlike the lower systemSj.has a high degree of self 
awareness enabling him to see a past, present and future. 
"The more man knows, the more freedom of choice 
he has, and the more he knows that he knows, the 
s4 more he can make purposive use of his freedom"^ 
Too much freedom of choice can become license unless it is understood in 
terms of its relationship to the limitations of nature's hierarchy of 
systems. For example, man can assume that all of his choices are self-
determined 'free' choices rather than choices that are co-determined 
with his environment. Man, with his increased level of knowledge, 
mistakenly assumes that the restraints of nature can be controlled,if 
not rejected,without serious consequences. This lack of social restraint 
enables man to become one of nature's most excessively violent species. 
"Man becomes a killer of his own species because he 
has failed to develop social restraints capable of 
substituting for the biological wisdom evolved under 
natural conditions."56 
53 
N. Nyiri, Op cit., p. 34. 
54 
E. Laszlo, Introduction To Systems Philosophy: Toward A Paradigm of Contemporary 
Thought, New York: Gordon and Breack Science Publishing Co., 1972, p. 247 
55Ibid., p. 240 
56 
R. Dubois, "Man's Nature and Social Institutions" in Ashley Montagu, Man 
and Aggression, second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 91. 
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While conflict is regulated and controlled within lower ordered 
systems by various homeostatic processes, man's potential for conflict 
can only be self-regulated. In nation state systems, the function of 
defence is more one of control rather than one of prevention. The 
prevention of conflict between men and nations is difficult to attain 
when unlimited demands continue to be made upon the finite natural 
system. 
The function of all defensive activity in the nation state system 
is to control the conflict that occurs within the confines of that 
political system itself (i.e. civil war and insurrection) as well as 
controlling the conflict that occurs between competing political systems 
(i.e. inter-state wars). The following diagram (Figure A-l) represents 
in a conceptual sense how the defence function is realized in a 
sequential fashion. 
A nation state's defence policy is a rational response by that 
nation's political authorities to control the conflict resulting from 
the natural competitiveness of open systems, thus maintaining the 
political system in its entirety. All questions of defence can be considered 
questions of survival. 
The real debate in the last few years has been between whether efforts 
should be intensified in the areas of conflict prevention or the areas of 
conflict management. General systems theory regards conflict springing from 
the natural competition between interacting systems as inevitable. This 
implies that efforts should be intensified in finding ways to control conflict 
within certain acceptable limits. Yet, the difference between conflict manage-
ment and conflict prevention may only be a semantic one when it is conceivable 
to control conflict by working to ameliorate those economic, social and 
political conditions that can give rise to conflict between nation states. Future 
studies of conflict in its hierarchial context may prove to be highly signifi-
cant in determining at what systems level efforts of conflict management may 













tS / 3^ 
General 
Systems Theory 















Defence establishments exist to carry out the task of 'professionalizing 
conflict' by conducting the conflict in the most efficient way to attain 
r Q 
victory. These defence establishments act as 'homeostatic agents' which 
attempt to restore the political system to a steady state condition and 
thus maintain the nation state system intact. It is unreasonable to argue, 
as some will, that it is possible to develop a credible defence policy 
59 
while having no military establishment to implement it. 
A. Rapoport, Op cit., p. 212 
59 
James Eayrs, "Military Policy and Middle Power: The Canadian Experience" 
in J. K. Gordon (ed) Canada's Role as a Middle Power, Toronto: Canadian Institute 
of International Affairs, 1966, p. 67. 
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Defensive activity and more specifically defence policy is a 
basic system activity that must be seen in its totality and not frag-
mented as is so often the case. 
Summary 
Canada's defence policy has precipitated a series of major 
political crises. Most of the research into the problem has been 
limited in both the scope and method of inquiry. As of yet, Canada's 
defence policy has not been considered in its totality, namely as being 
a primary activity serving the interests of national survival. 
The use of theory and more specifically general systems theory 
may enable one to view defensive activity and defence policy in a 
more holistic sense while continuing to employ certain scientific ri-
gour. General systems theory, being a normative theory with a scien-
tific base can be utilized in this purpose. 
There are two ruling principles that provide the focus for 
general systems theory. The first is the realization that certain 
common characteristics or tendencies of behaviour re-occur in all 
living organisms at various times. The second principle is the concept 
of organization. Every organization, no matter how simple or how com-
plex, exists in a natural hierarchy of systems. As a result of 
systems interaction competition occurs between the system parts which 
eventually leads to situations of potential conflict. 
From an understanding of these two principles combined with com-
petition and conflict between system parts, the defensive activity in 
all open systems can be explained in terms of general systems theory. 
23. 
As a corollary to this, a nation state's defence policy becomes 
a rational response by that nation's political authorities to control 
the conflict resulting from the natural competiveness occurring 
within the nation state system itself and the natural competiveness 
occurring between other nation state systems. 
With this theoretical perspective in mind, the following chapter 
details the historical development of Canada's defence policy. 
CHAPTER II 
The Development of Canadian Defence Policy 
The Perspective of General Systems Theory: 
As stated in the previous chapter, all living open systems are 
threatened by anabolic and catabolic rates of reaction which move the 
system from a state of undifferentiated wholeness to a differentiation 
of parts. This movement is referred to as progress when one system becomes 
a new type of system of a higher order and greater complexity. 
Progressive centralization within an open system sets into motion 
the forces that promote a gradual transition to progressive individual-
ization. As certain dominant parts begin to take a leading role in the 
system, they dictate certain types of behaviour to the whole, thus 
centralizing system activities. These are important characteristics to 
keep in mind in discussing how political systems such as the nation state 
system (NSS) and the international system (INS) have developed. 
However, man can alter many of the natural processes that occur 
within all open living systems. As stated previously, man lives in a 
symbolic universe of his own creation which has given him the power to 
L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op. cit., p. 70. 
In general systems theory, a retrogressive step from a high level of 
differentiation to a lower level of differentiation is also considered 
as growth over time. It is only in the social disciplines that growth 
has been assigned a positive normative value. 
24. 
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alter but not necessarily control the natural system and its biological 
restraints. While all natural open systems move towards progressive 
individualization or independence, man can intercede within his social 
systems and reverse this natural progression towards individualization. 
All natural and man-made social systems strive to reach a high level of 
2 
organization and complexity through time. 
A study of the development of the nation state shows an ongoing 
movement in the direction of progressive individualization and 
relative self-sufficiency. Territories and nationalities that were once 
colonies or protectorates have either progressed to become sovereign 
nation states in their own right or have disappeared by way of being ab-
sorbed into a larger, more viable^ political system. 
The development of the Canadian nation and more specifically its 
defence policy^which is a component part of any nation state system, 
reflects this natural progression from a highly centralized state of 
dependence upon the whole to a state of increased differentiation and 
individual self-sufficiency. 
For purposes of this thesis Canada's defence policy will be broken 
down into three distinct periods of development: (1) a period of dependence 
(1867-1940); (2) a period of interdependence (1940-1968); and (3) a period 
of relative independence (1968- ). In differentiating between one period 
of development and another, certain common characteristics of each period 
tend to re-occur to some degree in all three designated periods 
of development. 
E. Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy . . . . Op cit., p. 252. 
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For example, although a particular nation state may appear relative-
ly self-sufficient on one level of existence, that same nation state may 
be highly dependent upon another nation state for other resources that 
contribute to its continued existence. In general systems theory these 
periods of development are referred to as equifinal positions or inter-
's 
mediary stages arrived at independently of initial conditions. 
(1) A Period of Dependence (1867-1940) 
Prior to Confederation defence was of little concern to the colonial 
inhabitants of Upper and Lower Canada with the exception of those few 
situations where the threat of invasion from the United States seemed a 
4 
possibility. In these situations Britain was relied on to provide 
whatever defence was required. 
For economic reasons, Britain wanted to rid itself of the excessive 
burdens involved in defending a territory of such immense size as the North 
American colonies. Britain had more pressing concerns in Europe than in 
Br. North America. Furthermore, the colonial governments of Upper and Lower Canad 
had been demanding the right of complete self government prior to 
Confederation. British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli found it highly 
intolerable that Britain continue to pay for the defence of British North 
America when she could not govern her. Self-government implied self-defence. 
L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op. cit., p. 132. 
R.A. Preston, Canada and Imperial Defence: A Study of the Origins of 
The British Commonwealth Defence Organization 1867-1919, Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1967, p. 39. The U.S. Civil War and the Trent 
Crisis of 1861 alarmed many colonials as relations between Britain and 
the United States appeared to be rapidly deteriorating. At various 
times, talk of invading Canada was heard in many high places through-
out the United States. 
'G.F. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of An Unmilitary 
People, third edition, Toronto: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974, p. 240. 
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When the British North America Act of 1867 was signed it granted 
Canada dominion status and the responsibility of defending itself. The 
Macdonald government placed considerable emphasis on defence and the 
need to build a permanent militia in the early years of Confederation. 
Sir George Etienne Cartier, Canada's first Minister of the Militia, 
committed the Macdonald government in policy to the building of a permanent 
militia. 
"No people can lay claim to the title of a nation 
if it does not possess a military element - the 
means of defence."' 
However, stated government policy gave way to more pressing and 
immediate concerns than the creation of a permanent militia. Prime 
Minister Macdonald's frantic concern to build the Canadian Pacific 
Railway to span the Canadian nation from coast to coast,regardless of 
Q 
cost, drew attention away from the problems of defence. 
It was not until the British Colonial Secretary informed the Governor-
General of Canada in early 1870 that all British regular troops would be 
withdrawn that defence became an immediate concern to the Macdonald 
9 
government. Prior to this, the Militia Act of 1868 had established a 
volunteer militia force which was broken down into small bands of volunteers 
The British North America Act, 1867, Section 91(7) 'Militia, Military and 
Naval service, and Defence. 
R.A. Preston, Canadian Defence Policy and the Development of the Canadian 
Nation 1867-1917, Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Publication, 
#25 1970, p. 4. 
'G„ Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Affairs: The Formative 
Years to 1914, Volume I, revised edition, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Ltd., 1966, p. 226. 
G.F. Stanley, Op. cit., p„ 241. 
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who met only on certain special occasions. It became obvious that the 
Macdonald government's volunteer militia had been a token gesture in 
the sense that the militia behaved more like a fraternity than a well 
trained fighting force. 
When the British regulars were withdrawn in 1871, the Canadian 
government did very little to fill the void. It was not until the 
establishment of the Royal Military College in 1874 that the government 
started to develop a command structure for a virtually leaderless 
11 
volunteer militia. 
The Militia Act of 1883 finally set up a small permanent militia 
for reasons that grew out of the necessity of crisis more than from any 
understanding of how important defence was to a young nation. Macdonald's 
use of the permanent militia to put down the Riel rebellion of 1885 
indicated the importance of having a permanent fighting force that was 
both well trained and well equipped. The citizen soldiers of 1885 had 
12 
won the day, but only just barely. 
While many Canadians exhibited a certain complacency towards 
defence matters, the Canadian militia attempted to prepare itself to meet any 
10 
R. H. Roy, "The Canadian Military Tradition" in H. Massey (ed.) The 
Canadian Military: A Profile, Toronto; Copp-Clark Publishing Co., 
1972, p. 27. 
G. F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 244. 
12Ibid., p. 258. 
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13 
crisis. Limited government financing combined with outdated weaponry 
and poor inconsistent training made their attempts practically futile. 
Britain still regarded the Dominion of Canada as a dependent entity. 
When Britain committed itself to numerous military adventures abroad, 
Canada was expected to contribute to the imperial effort to retain the 
14 British Empire, a common goal for all of Britain s dominions. Although 
Canada made a significant contribution to the British victory in South 
Africa, Prime Minister Laurier served notice to the British in 1900 that 
a new and independent Canada would no longer accept the dictates of 
imperial centralization. 
"I claim for Canada this, that, in future, Canada 
shall be at liberty to act or not to act, to 
interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she 
pleases and that she shall reserve for herself 
the right to judge whether or not there is a 
cause for her to act. ^-5 
13 
In the late 1890's Lord Dundonald, the chief commanding officer of the 
Canadian militia made several recommendations to improve the quality 
of the militia. These recommendations were regarded with skepticism 
and distaste by politicians and civilians alike. Prime Minister 
Laurier suggested that Dundonald 'not take the militia seriously, for 
though It is useful for suppressing internal disturbances, it will 
not be required for the defence of the country, as the Monroe Doctrine 
protects us from enemy aggression.' For reference Ibid., p. 294. 
Also, the Canadian press expressed a type of distaste for Dundonald 
and his recommendations for a better militia. An editorial in the 
Montreal Herald of 1902 expressed the general view that many Canadians 
held regarding war and militarism. "With Europe war is a condition. 
With us [Canadians] it is a theory." For details see G. Glazebrook, 
Op. cit., p. 229. 
14 
Ibid., p. 234. 
15 
G.F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 288. Prime Minister Laurier was torn by his 
commitment to the two solitudes of French Canada and English Canada. 
The fact that he was a French Canadian Prime Minister with a natural 
distaste for British imperialism was tempered by the realization that 
he was a political leader of a predominantly English speaking country 
which strongly supported British adventurism. 
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The obvious contradiction between this ideal of independence of choice 
and Canada's natural dependence on Britain revealed itself as Europe 
prepared itself for world war. Britain's Joseph Chamberlain did not 
hide the fact that the expense of Canada's defence would be borne, by 
Britain. In return for this protection, he fully expected that Canada 
would contribute more in terms of resources and personnel to the 
16 defence of the Empire. 
At the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, Britain advocated the 
creation of a common defence scheme between all dominions. This would 
involve the military standardization of all dominions in terms of policy 
guidelines set down by Britain: 
"There would be only one school of study, one 
curriculum and one teacher; there might be 
several schoolhouses but the lessons taught in 
17 each would be identical." 
For Canada, this meant a form of regression to a state of complete de-
pendence. It seemed that many of the concessions acquired from Britain 
since Confederation had been lost by Canada's acceptance of this 
defensive arrangement. 
In general systems terminology, a movement towards progressive 
individualization is often countered by an equivalent movement towards 
18 increased centralization and undifferentiated wholeness. 
When Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914, Canada 
had only the freedom 'to determine the extent and nature of her contribution 
'19 
to war and not the right to proclaim neutrality. In battle, the British 
-i r 
G. Glazebrook, Op. cit., p. 238. 
G. F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 304. 
18 
L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . pp cit., p. 71. 
19 yG. F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 310. 
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military command lumped Canadian soldiers together with its own regulars. 
Canadian political leaders protested against this lack of differentiation 
and insisted that Canadian soldiers be viewed as serving the interests 
of Canada abroad. For if the British were to recognize the independent 
status of the Canadian soldier then this could amount to a de facto 
20 
recognition of Canada's independence. Gradually, Canada was beginning 
to exercise more and more freedom within the confines of this highly 
centralized imperial defence arrangement. 
At the end of World War I, Canadian defence policy encountered a 
significant degree of governmental complacency. When the crisis of war 
subsided and peace returned, the Canadian government neglected defence 
policy again and allowed the wartime effectiveness of the military to 
21 deteriorate in the areas of weapons modernization and personnel morale. 
Consequently, Canadian defence policy had become crisis oriented in that 
it only received day to day consideration only during extended periods 
of crisis. 
In the general systems context, a form of natural dependency can 
develop for those parts that fall behind their competitors. If a nation's 
defence policy is crisis oriented and merely reactive in its responses to 
actions that are initiated by others, then that nation can exercise very 
little control in crisis situations. More specifically, when a nation's 
defence policy becomes merely a stimulus-response syndrome, the prediction 
of conflict becomes haphazard and its control virtually non-existent. 
After the conclusion of World War I, the Canadian government was 
desirous of striking up a new and more autonomous relationship with 
Ibid„, p. 315. 
Ibid., p. 340. 
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Britain. At the 1926 Imperial Conference, Canada was granted certain 
important concessions from Britain. The most important being Britain's 
agreement that Canada would no longer be automatically committed to any 
future European war. Canada would be a signatory to any major treaty5 
22 including a declaration of war. 
Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, like his predecessors, had 
a strong sense of mistrust of European political affairs. When the 
possibility arose for Canada to be elected as a non-permanent member of 
the Council of the League of Nations, King'was hesitant in involving 
23 
Canada in European politics. When the Italian army invaded Ethiopia 
in 1935, the King government supported the use of sanctions by the League 
of Nations in principle but King refused to adopt any military or economic 
sanctions against Italy in the fear of committing Canada to some future 
European war. 
For many years, Prime Minister King was able to steer a course down 
the middle of the road between isolationism in fact and collective 
security in principle. Canada's defence policy reflected this ambiguity 
in governmental policy. During the depression years, the Canadian military 
establishment incurred serious cutbacks in both its financing and 
25 personnel. Attempts to bolster the defence budget in the years prior 
22 
H.B. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King 1924-1932: The Lonely Heights 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970, p. 188. 
23Ibid., p. 194. 
24 
F. Soward, J. Parkinson, N. MacKenzie, T. MacDermot, Canada in World 
Affairs: The Pre-War Years, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941, p. 25. 
25 
G.F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 343. 
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to 1937 met with stiff opposition. 
However, the increasing prospects of war in Europe, combined with 
a proposal by Major-General A. McNaughton to streamline the Canadian 
militia, loosened the purse-strings of the King government. 
A further development was occuring within the confines of the 
Canadian defence establishment. The defence establishment was exhibit-
ing aspects of growth and development from within as it moved from a 
general state of undifferentiated wholeness to a differentiation of the 
parts and 'a division of labour.' 
The 1936 re-organization of the Canadian militia by Major-General 
McNaughton recommended the creation of a Canadian Defence Committee 
with the function of co-ordinating the militia's activities with those 
27 
of other government departments. This development can be accounted for 
in general systems theory: 
"If the system (i.e. defence establishment) is 
split up into individual causal chains, these 
go on independently. Increasing mechanization 
means increasing determination of elements 
to functions only dependent on themselves and 
consequent loss of regularity which rests in 
the system as a whole, owing to the inter-
relations present."28 
Slowly, Canada's defence policy was beginning to develop both form 
and substance. Its defence policy was no longer to be paraphrased as 
the defence of the British Empire. 
26 
Ibid., p. 346. 
27 
Ibid., p. 347. 
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L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . Op. cit., p. 69. 
The development of Canada's defence establishment will be discussed 
in greater detail in the following chapter. 
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(2) A Period of Interdependence (1940-1968) 
A differentiation between the period of dependence (1867-1940) and 
the period of interdependence (1940-1968) is important to understand 
both for their distinct differences and similarities. For purposes of 
this thesis, the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 is selected as the initial 
take-off point for the period of interdependence by which Canada agreed 
to allow the United States and Britain the use of Canadian soil for 
29 defensive activities relating to their war efforts. 
All parties to this agreement fully realized that this concession 
was not merely a temporary one, but rather a long-term commitment by 
Canada for the defence of North America. The Ogdensburg Agreement was 
the formal acceptance of the principle of North American defence which 
had been worked out two years prior to the Agreement itself. 
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King met at Kingston, 
Ontario in 1938 to lay the foundation for this mutual commitmenti 
President Roosevelt assured Canada that the United States would not 
'stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other 
30 
empire.' Prime Minister King's counter-endorsement of Canada's 
commitment to the defence of the United States was far more explicit, 
leaving little room for interpretation: 
34. 
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J.S. Pemberton (ed.) "Ogdensburg, Hyde Park -- and After" in Behind 
The Headlines (April, 1941), p. 3. 
30 
R.M. Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: Two Years of War (1939-1941) 
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 237. Many observers at 
the time regarded the President's guarantee as nothing more than 
an extension of the Monroe doctrine. 
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"Canada would regard it as her duty to see that, 
at our own instance, our country is made as 
immune from attack or possible invasion as we 
can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, 
should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces 
should not be able to pursue their way, either 
by land, sea or air to the United States across 
Canadian territory."31 
The significant differences in these two official statements on 
a common problem, the defence of North America, indicated the type of 
relationship these nations had with each other. President Roosevelt 
spoke in generalities which allowed him the freedom to react to any 
crisis in terms of whether or not it was in the national interest of the 
United States. Prime Minister King, on the other hand, reflecting 
Canada's growing dependence on American military superiority, made a blanket 
commitment to intervene to stop any threat to North American security. 
More specifically, every threat against North America was to be perceived 
as a threat against Canada. In the case of the Americans, there was some 
element of choice involved in their decision of whether or not to act. 
Although on the surface the declaratory policies coming out of Canada 
and the United States -emphasized interdependence and mutuality in problems 
of continental defence, in reality there was clear cut substantive 
evidence of a growing dependency by Canada on the U.S. 
As the war in Europe dragged on, Canada found it self in
 cthe position 
of paying off Britain's growing war deficit by borrowing money from the 
United States. This situation increased Canada's national debt and created 
32 
an unhealthy balance of trade deficit with its neighbour to the south. 
G.F. Stanley, Op. cit., p. 407. 
R. Cuff, J. Granatstein, Canadian American Relations in Wartime: From 
the Great War to the Cold War, Toronto: Hakkert Publishing Co., 1975, 
p. 74. 
36, 
The 1941 Hyde Park Agreement strengthened this dependency relation-
ship by broadening the scope of continental defence to include as well 
33 
'the economic defence of the Western Hemisphere.' Although the Hyde 
Park Agreement held out some promise for the development of a defence 
production industry in Canada, in the long run the agreement served to 
make Canada more dependent on United States technology. 
Since the United States had both the financial and technological 
base to support new weapons development on a massive scale, Canada found 
itself dependent on the U.S. for the benefits of that technology. 
" . . . despite the spirit of the Declaration 
[Hyde Park] Canada remained dependent on the 
U.S. for new weapons, and for all intents and 
purposes, the development of a long range defence 
policy depends on weapons-systems production at 
home."34 
As discussed in the previous section on Canada's early dependency 
on Britain prior to World War I, military standardization by one dominant 
part over the other parts of the system tends to serve the interests of 
the whole system often at the expense of the individual parts that seek 
increased independence. While Canada perceived that a mutual partner-
ship with the United States in certain areas would grant her more freedom .. 
and independence of action, increased interdependence had restored a new 
type of dependence instead. 
During World War II, the United States government increasingly 
informed rather than consulted Canada when it came to matters of North 
The Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie King, House of Commons 
Debates, April 28, 1949, p. 2289. 
N. Nyiri, Alternatives to Nuclear Warfare: A Possible Role for Canada 
in US/USSR Nuclear Balance, Waterloo: Waterloo Lutheran University 1972, 
Volume II, Occasional Paper #2, p. 416. 
37, 
35 
American defence. While the Canadian government talked of mutuality and 
equal partnership, the United States did not respond as an equal partner 
but rather acted as a dominant part of the whole system. 
"The sum total of all these developments was 
that Canada, in fact if not in theory ceased 
to be the equal partner in continental defence 
envisaged in 1938 and 1940."36 
In an attempt to reverse this strong movement towards a centralized 
form of regional, defence, the Canadian government looked toward Europe as 
a possible counterweight to offset a growing dependency on the United 
States. The major threat to Canada after World War II was the growing 
possibility of a future nuclear war in Europe between the allied forces 
and the Soviet Union. In any nuclear exchange, Canadian airspace would 
be an inevitable battleground with a certain number of Soviet atomic 
37 
bombs falling on Canadian soil. 
In response to this threat, the Canadian government felt that 
Canada could -best be defended as far away from her native shores as >^ 
possible by involving herself in collective defence arrangements abroad. 
-3-8 
This became the basis for the argument of Europe being Canada s first line 
of defence. 
35 
G.F. Stanley, Op. ci t., p. 409. The United States would often bypass 
the Canadian government and consult Britain on matters of North 
American defence. The defence of Newfoundland and Greenland and the 
installation of a destroyer base on Canadian soil were two examples of 
this tendency by the United States to inform Canada after the decisions 
had been made. 
36Ibid., p. 415. 
37 
General Charles Foulkes, Canadian Chief of Staff speaking in 1948 as 
quoted in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacekeeping and Deterrence 
Volume III, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 100. 
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The Honourable Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, House of 
Commons Debates, Friday, March 27, 1953, p. 3339. 
The creation of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 
complemented the beliefs of many Canadian politicians that if enough 
collective security pacts existed 'to girdle the globe' then the prospect 
39 
for world peace would be enhanced. However, collective security admin-
istered through such international bodies as the United Nations by itself 
proved to be insufficient. The fall of Czechoslovakia to the Communists 
on February 25, 1948, indicated to the major Western powers that an 
European defensive alliance capable of using force would be needed to 
halt Soviet aggression. 
As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) grew 
out of the belief that collective self defence on a regional basis would 
fill those gaps the United Nations could not fill. In the bipolar world 
of the nineteen-fifties, Canada attempted to encourage the larger super-
powers to commit themselves to various multilateral treaties and agree-
ments. If enough structural organizations existed to compel the larger 
superpowers to resolve their differences through negotiation, the 
possibility of conflict occurring would be lessened. 
In a systems context, Canada's role was one of 'systems modulation' 
There were two possible options that Canada could pursue simultaneously 
in its role as systems modulator. 
Option 1: Moderate the views and behaviour of the only superpower actor 
to which Canada had some effective measure of access 
: the United States. 
39 
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Foreign Affairs, Volume XXVII (April 1949), p. 374. 
40 
Denis Stairs, "The Foreign Policy of Canada" in J. Rosenau, K. Thompson 
and G. Boyd (eds.) World Politics: An Introduction, New York: Free Pres 
Publishers, 1976, p. 194. 
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Option 2: Exercise a constraining influence on such conflicts as might 
break out in peripheral parts of the global system, with a 
view to preventing them from escalating to the great power 
level. 
It was in the context of these two foreign policy options that Canada's 
defence policy was expected to operate in the late fifties and early 
sixties. 
But, carrying out these options meant that the majority of Canadian 
military personnel would be committed to crisis situations abroad over 
which they had no actual control. 
"This amounted in essence to a claim \that 
overall decisions relating to military 
requirements, were being made elsewhere, 
and that Canada was performing--faithfully--
an externally assigned role."^ 
This fact became more obvious with the controversy surrounding the NORAD 
debate in 1957. The conflict between foreign policy objectives and the 
fulfillment of basic defensive obligations required in Canada's commit-
ment to collective security had shown the inherent contradictions in 
government policy. The previous position that Canada's best line of 
defence should be established as far away from Canadian shores as 
43 
possible offered little for the immediate defence of Canada. 
The sound military logic of NORAD was lost in the political 
confusion and the semantic problems created by the Diefenbaker government 
44 
and the opposition political parties. In an attempt to disguise Canada s 
41Ibid., p. 194. 
42 
Denis Stairs, "The Military as an Instrument . . . . Op. cit., p. 101. 
Refer to Brooke Claxton, op. cit., p. 3339. 
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natural dependency on the United States in matters of defence, the 
Canadian government argued that NORAD was an 'integrated part' of the 
45 NATO Alliance. 
The long delay in accepting NORAD accomplished very little in grant-
ing Canada a more credible voice in North American defence strategy. The 
Canadian government's concern for sovereignty and independence served only t 
increase Canadian dependence on the American deterrent capability. 
While Canada reaffirmed a commitment to the principle of 
collective security, it was unwilling to be associated with any existing 
organization or weapons system that backed up that collective security 
principle. The nuclear weapons debate of the late fifties and early 
sixties was one more indication of this very point. Improved develop-
ments in strategic nuclear weapons placed a great strain on the Canadian 
government to go with the trend or risk the consequences of rejecting new 
technology. If Canada were to accept strategic nuclear weapons then this 
would mean that Canada had gone 'nuclear'. This course of action would have 
represented going back on an earlier general commitment made after World 
46 War II that Canada would not become a nuclear power. 
But, a total rejection of nuclear weapons would amount to an 
Ibid., p. 54. This position was refuted by both the American author-
ities and Secretary-General of NATO, Paul-Henri Spaak, who regarded 
NORAD strictly as a bilateral military agreement. 
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Canada, Department of National Defence White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1964), p. 7. The Canadian position not to become'a 
nuclear power', was shrouded in contradiction. For years, successive 
Canadian governments continued to sell uranium to the United States 
for military and non-military purposes. Also, the Canadian government 
had granted U.S. authorities permission to fly their nuclear air 
carriers into Canadian airspace. For more details see J. McLin, 
Op. cit. , p. 128. 
abdication of Canada's responsibility for sharing in continental defence 
with the United States and living up to its defensive obligations in 
NATO. There was no escape from the reality that Canada would have to 
continue to play its part in the NATO/NORAD alliances which meant placing 
tactical nuclear weapons in Canadian hands. The real issue was one of 
control. Should Canada have exclusive control over any nuclear weapons 
emplaced on Canadian territory or provided for its military forces 
47 
stationed in Europe? 
Without resolving the moral issue of whether or not Canada should 
have nuclear weapons, the Diefenbaker government acquired the necessary 
delivery systems for such nuclear weapons. Bomarc missiles were emplaced 
on Canadian soil and made operational in March 1962. They were not armed 
48 
with nuclear warheads until early 1964. Honest John rockets were 
provided for the Canadian brigade in NATO in early 1962 but no nuclear 
/ n 
warheads were installed on them until the middle of 1964. 
For a period of approximately two years from the middle of 1962 
to early 1964, the Canadian armed forces had only conventional capabiliti 
to meet any possible nuclear threat. It was factually impossible for 
Canada's armed forces to be provided with nuclear weapons 'if and when 
they were required' in an emergency situation as the Canadian government 
47 
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i • A 5 0 claimed. 
During the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 when the Soviet 
Union threatened to penetrate the continental defence of North America, 
Canada was in a situation of total dependence on the nuclear 
deterrence capability of the United States to defend Canada against 
nuclear attack. 
As a result of this crisis situation, the new Canadian government 
accepted Canada's obligation to NATO and NORAD by providing its armed 
forces with the necessary tactical nuclear weapons. A forced acceptance 
of one's responsibilities had proven to be a bitter pill to swallow. 
Canadian political authorities were eager to look for new roles and 
responsibilities that could be effectively performed without stirring up 
unwanted controversy. 
It was the Canadian government's desire that the whole basis of 
defence policy be reexamined with special reference being made 
to finding 'more realistic and effective roles' for Canada to play in 
the NATO/NORAD Alliance systems. The Pearson government hoped that 
Canadian industry would be capable of supplying the needs of its defence 
52 policy commitments. 
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The Right Honourable John Diefenbaker, House of Commons Debates, 
January 18, 1969, #1, p. 73. Prime Minister Diefenbaker argued that 
it was possible for Canada's armed forces to receive nuclear weapons 
from the United States within half an hour. This was not possible 
as Canada had no agreement with the United States for such an 
exchange. 
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The 1964 White Paper on Defence represented the embodiment of these 
hopes f o r a more m e a n i n g f u l d e f e n c e p o l i c e . Hhe WhiJ-p Pappr rprniumpndpH 
shifting the locus of Canada's defence policy away from the bilateral 
concerns of North American defence to the broader and more universal 
concerns of collective security in Europe and the United Nations, 
This emphasis on multilateralism and the downplaying of Canada's natural 
dependency on the United States reaffirmed the persistent Canadian 
54 
belief in mutual deterrence through collective security. The de-
emphasizing of the defence of Canada by means of bilateral agreements 
between Canada and the United States represented a marked departure from 
55 *r"~~ 
previous defence White Papers, /v^ -—' 
Also, the White Paper proposed a complete reorganization of the 
military establishment with the hope of making it more flexible and 
versatile In performing its assigned tasks. Flexibility was a key term 
that repeatedly appeared in the White Paper. 
"The goal of flexibility was dictated by the 
view that a country of Canada's size and resources 
could no longer afford to invest in expensive 
weapons systems that were useful only for one 
mission which changing strategic or political 
conditions might render inappropriate."56 
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Canada's various White Papers on Defence spanning the years 1949 to 
1959 repeatedly established that the defence of Canada was the 
primary objective of her defence policy. The 1964 White Paper on 
Defence shifted this objective to a tertiary position in terms of 
priority. 
J. McLin, Op. cit., p. 200. 
What the Canadian government was looking for was a multipurpose 
weapon that would perform more than one role with limited expense. For 
example, a substitute was sought for the CF-104 Starfighter, a tactical 
support aircraft which could perform both ground-to-air support 
a n d fly surveillance and reconnaisance missions. However, multi-
purpose weapons systems are a rare commodity in an age of highly 
sophisticated weapons technology that develops weapons systems for 
specific needs. 
The Pearson government further handicapped itself in its search 
for weapons flexibility by setting up an arbitrary budget figure for up-
coming defence expenditures and then manipulated Canada's defence 
requirements so that they fell in line with that arbitrary figure. This 
frugal approach to defence spending was criticized because no preliminary 
analysis on objectives was attempted prior to setting down any 
1, 1 - f 5 8 
budgetary figures. 
As a result, Canada's new-look armed forces were expected to 
carry out existing responsibilities8 as well as assuming the 
challenging demands of international peacekeepingjWith the same amount 
of money. As could be expected, the functional utility of Canada's 
armed forces was taxed to the limit. 
As a result, the Canadian defence establishment became less concerned wi 
military problems than with finding ways to economize in the performance 
of its responsibilities. Although economy in government spending is a 
57Ibid., p. 200. 
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For further details refer to The Special Committee on Defence, House 
of Commons, Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence (Ottawa: Queen's 
Printer), Thursday May 28, 1964, p. 43. 
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desirable goal, it is 'essentially extraneous to the immediate pursuit of 
59 Canada's role in world affairs.' 
A certain number of basic limitations that resisted the 
successful implementation of those policy changes recommended in the 
1964 White Paper, prevailed. The first and most important limitation was the 
recognition that Canada had long established defence commitments to the 
NATO and NORAD Alliances that had to be respected. Although Canada was not 
the dominant part of these alliance systems it was expected 'to pull its 
own weight. 
Furthermore, the Canadian government's desire to utilize Canada's 
industrial resources to fulfil its defence policy requirements was severely 
handicapped by the government's support of competitive bidding. Canadian 
industry, lacking the economic and technological base to be competitive, 
was unable to match her American counterpart in weapons cost and delivery 
A <- 6 1 
dates. 
Canada's defence production industry required some form of govern-
ment protection before it could hope to compete with the more competitive 
defence production industries in the United States. The cancellation of 
the Avro-Arrow defence project in early 1959 indicated how dependent 
Canadian defence policy was on American weapons systems. The 
Canadian government argued for the principle of competitive bidding on 
59 
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the pretext of wanting to obtain good value for every defence dollar 
63 
spent. 
As a result, Canadian defence buying policy took on the appearance 
64 
of being highly inconsistent in terms of obtaining value. While certain 
aspects of Canada's defence production industry were protected by the 
government, other aspects of that same industry (i.e. Canada's aircraft 
industry) were given little or no protection whatsoever. Often certain 
barter type arrangements were made with other NATO member nations for the 
purchase of weapons systems that proved unsuitable for Canada's needs. 
The cumulative effect of these various decisions during the mid-
sixties was to increase Canada's dependency on the United States for 
A f 6 6 
defence. 
Although the 1964 White Paper on Defence promised new responsibilities 
and a significant change in direction, very little had in fact changed 
from the fifties and early sixties. Canada's defence policy continued 
to be understood and justified in terms of alliance commitments to 
NATO and NORAD. 
(3) A Period of Relative Independence (1968 - ). 
The concept of 'independence' as used here in the context of Canada's 
defence policy must be interpreted with a certain amount of caution. By 
63 xhe Honourable C M . Drury, Minister of Industry, House of Commons 
Debates, February 7, 1966, pp. 802-803. 
"^"Gideon Rosenbluth, The Canadian Economy and Disarmament, Toronto: 
Macmillan of Canada Ltd., 1967, p. 40. 
The purchase of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV's) for Canada's NATO 
forces in 1966 is one case in point of a weapon that was unsuited for 
Canadian needs. The AFV's proved to be too heavy for airlifting and 
their steel tracks tore up roads and terrain alike. For more details 
see J. Sheltus, Op. cit., p. 12. 
66 
Gideon Rosenbluth, Op. cit., p. 41. 
no means can independence be thought of in absolute terms. 
"No nation can enjoy the degree of independence 
in decision which existed in earlier times. 
Every major decision has become immensely more 
complicated by the considerations which new 
military technology, science, economics and 
humanitarian obligations present to the 
governments concerned. The great powers have 
more complex considerations to weigh but the 
lesser powers cannot expect to have much free-
dom of choice either. Independence in foreign 
affairs cannot have quite the same meaning as 
in other fields."67 
In general systems theory, a degree of 'independence' is possible 
for every system part only if it remains an integral part of the system. 
More specifically, the degree of independence attained by a system part 
is proportionate to the level of interdependence enforced within the 
u , 6 8 
whole system. 
When considering a possible period of independence in Canadian 
defence policy, it is relative to how interdependent 
Canada was in terms of the whole international system. The 1964 White 
Paper on defence attempted to set down new roles and responsibilities 
that Canada's armed forces could perform aside from her usual alliance 
contributions. 
Peacekeeping was the ideal vehicle through which Canada could make 
an important individual contribution to international peace and security 
69 
as well as integrating both her defence policy and her foreign policy. 
However, peacekeeping began to lose its appeal when UNEF was ordered out 
T h e Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of External Affairs, 
Statements and Speeches, January 31, 1966. 
E. Laszlo, Introduction to System Philosophy . . . . Op. cit., p. 239. 
A.M. Taylor, D. Cox and J. Granatstein, Peacekeeping: International 
Challenge and Canadian Response, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 1968, pp. 49-51. 
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by the Egyptians in 1967. 
The year 1968 represented a significant year in the continuing 
evolution of both Canada's defence and foreign policies. 
Canadians had elected a new Prime Minister with a different perspective 
on the role that Canada should play in world affairs. Prime Minister 
Trudeau's concerns were less directed towards the international 
community than they were towards an economically viable Canadian society. 
In the Prime Minister's opinion this was the best contribution that 
Canada could make to the international community. 
The Trudeau government promised a more realistic appraisal of 
Canada's foreign and defence policies when it announced its foreign 
71 policy review in early 1968. Prime Minister Trudeau expressed certain 
personal preferences regarding Canada's alliance contributions to both 
NATO and NORAD. It was the view of the new government that Canada had 
overcommitted herself to NATO on the Pearsonian assumption that Europe 
was Canada's first JLine of defence. This European commitment had led to 
72 the unfavourable situation of NATO dictating Canadian foreign policy. 
Prime Minister Trudeau personally believed that it was NORAD and not 
73 NATO that held the key to Canada's defence policy. 
On the 3rd of April, 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau announced the 
phased reduction of Canadian armed personnel in her NATO contingent in 
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Europe. While Canadian forces in NATO were cut back by approximately 
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50 percent, there were very few cutbacks made in its NORAD 
contribution. The shift in Canada's defensive commitments from Europe 
to North America indicated the Trudeau government's desire to have a 
75 greater input in the determination of continental defence. 
However while these developments were occurring in Ottawa, certain 
other related developments were unfolding in Washington that had an 
important bearing on North American defence strategy and, more specific-
ally, Canada's defence policy. In the latter part of the sixties, an 
explosion in weapons technology occurred which placed all questions of 
military strategy open to debate. The most significant technological 
breakthroughs in weapons development came in those areas that related 
directly to improving a nation's defensive capability. Both the United 
States and Soviet Union had made significant advances in developing 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence (AEMD) systems that could be deployed 
exclusive!*^ on home soil. 
As a result of this technological development, the basis of 
continental defence became subject to question. Canada had become less 
important in American plans to defend the United States, the continent 
j , J 7 6 and the deten-ent. 
Canadian politicians and the military alike were fully aware that 
these new developments could force hard decisions on smaller'nations 
like Canada. If the United States decided to install either the Sentinel 
or Safeguard ABMD systems on American soil, then that would tend to 
fragment the defence of North America.' 
75 
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Although the United States government decided to postpone the full 
scale implementation of the ABMD system due to its exorbitant cost, 
individual ABMD systems (Safeguard) were installed around some of the 
larger American cities. The significance of the whole ABMD issue centered 
not in the weapon itself but rather it indicated the kind of changes that 
defensive weapons like ABMD could bring about, affecting future 
military strategy. 
In the past, weapons technology had favoured the development of 
general all-purpose offensive weapons, such as the hydrogen bomb, which 
has been used in an indiscriminate manner. In recent years, 
weapons development has shifted away from indiscriminate offensive 
weapons systems to the more discriminating tactical offensive weapons as 
7 8 
well as active and passive defence measures. 
These technological developments in weapons systems created a new 
attitude of 'arbitrariness' in Washington toward its military allies. 
For many years, United States authorities had continued to warn its allies 
that if they did not contribute more to alliance defence then the United 
79 States would not continue to bankrupt itself for their benefit. 
This arbitrary attitude in Washington towards America" s allies was 
reflected by both the United States Congress and the Nixon administration 
alike. When Senator Fulbright, then chairman of the highly prestigious 
Foreign Relations Committee, was asked if the Canadian government had been 
7 8 
Weapons technology and how it influences Canada's defence policy will 
be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
79 
For more details on the growing expense of alliance defence for the 
Americans, refer to Chapters One and Four of Bruce Russett's What 
Price Vigilance?: The Burdens of National Defence, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970, pp 1-22, pp. 91-123 respectively. 
'informed' of the installation of the ABM Safeguard on the U.S. border, 
his response that Canadians either 'like it or lump it' was indicative 
80 
of this hardening in attitudes. 
The Nixon administration although more tactful than certain members 
of Congress, encouraged Canada to assume more 'autonomous and independent 
policies' for each nation must decide the requirements of its own 
security. This policy became popularly known as the Nixon Doctrine. 
Canada was being forewarned that weapons technology had brought about 
certain changes in strategic conditions. Canadian territory was not as 
imperative to 'continental defence' efforts as it had been in the past. 
Also, the Nixon Doctrine emphasized that Canada become more self 
reliant in economic matters as well as in matters of security. On 
August 15, 1971, the United States levied a 10 percent surcharge on all 
Canadian exports entering the United States. This unilateral action 
forced the Canadian government to reexamine Canada's position as an 
industrial and trading nation. 
The conclusions drawn from that reexamination basically reaffirmed 
the geographical fact that Canada was, for better or worse, a North 
American nation whose destiny lay with the United States and the 
on 
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Options for the Future" in International Perspectives (Ottawa: Department 
of External Affairs, Autumn 1972), p. 7. 
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Refer back to R. Sutherland's argument in 1962 that geography 
'strategically committed' United States to the defence of Canada. 
Geography is not as important a factor as it was in 1962. 
T h e Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of External Affairs, 




What is significant in the recognition of this basic fact is that 
the Trudeau government fully realized that Canadian independence to any 
appreciable degree could only be attained through increased inter-
dependence. 
" . . . our goal should be to exercise our 
national independence, political and economic 
alike, as responsible parts of a whole that 
can be greater than its parts, where, each 
pursues his own interests and aspirations 
with full respect for the interests and 
aspirations of others . . . . "°5 
To acquire sufficient independence of action within the confines of 
a highly interdependent relationship is a problem common to all living 
systems. A corresponding desire by the parts for increased individual-
ization is countered by the whole system's tendency to increase, central-
ization and thus make the natural dependency of the parts to the whole 
86 
even greater. 
Under these changing conditions the Trudeau government tabled its 
1971 White Paper on Defence - Defence in the 70's. The White Paper 
represented a significant shift away from the general concerns of alliance 
defence to the more specific concerns of defending Canadian territory. 
The prevention of nuclear war through mutual deterrence remained the major 
87 
objective of Canada's defence policy as it had in previous White Papers. 
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Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70's (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, August 1971). 
However, there was a distinct shift in emphasis given to those priorities 
by which that mutual deterrence objective could be attained. The four 
major priorities to be carried out by Canada's armed forces were the 
following: 
(a) Surveillance of Canadian Territory and Coastline, i.e. 
Protection of Canadian sovereignty; 
(b) Defence of North America in cooperation with the United States; 
(c) The fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed 
upon; 
(d) The performance of such international peacekeeping roles 
88 
as we may from time to time assume. 
Unlike the 1964 White Paper on Defence, Defence in the 70's related 
explicitly to Canada's natloBaJr-irtfrereg-ts. Such terms as 'sovereignty 
and independence', 'economic well being', 'aid to the civil power' and 
'national development' appeared frequently throughout the text of the 
Defence White Paper. 
While some viewed the 1971 Defence White Paper as a form of 
'retrenchment', it would be more precise to regard the White Paper as an 
attempt to rationalize existing defence roles with the prospect of 
improving
 t n e capability to perform Canadian defined functions and 
89 
assist in protecting the U.S. deterrent at the same time. The phased 
reduction of Canadian armed personnel in NATO as well as the dropping 
Ibid., p. 16. 
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Compact" in Behind The Headlines , Vol. XXXIII, #4, Sept., 1974, p. 24. 
54, 
of its NATO nuclear strike role seemed to indicate Canada's abandonment of 
90 
Europe as an essential counterweight to the United States. 
However, for most western nations, defence policy decisions are 
91 
essentially economic decisions. As the Trudeau government continued 
to reassess its defence policy, it was becoming obvious that the economics 
of defending Canada would ultimately determine the strength of the 
Trudeau government's commitment to change. The Trudeau government, like 
its predecessor, wanted to provide the best means of defence for the least 
amount of money. The emphasis in the 1971 Defence White Paper was on 
developing a highly mobile and well-equipped military force to carry out 
92 
these new roles. Much of the existing military equipment proved un-
suitable for many of the new roles being proposed in the Defence White 
93 
Paper. 
J|>*^  The significance of the 1971 White Paper on Defence in comparison 
to other Defence White Papers is the recognition that defence begins at 
94 
home. While previous Defence. White Papers emphasized Canada's inter-
national commitments before its national responsibilities, the 1971 
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For example, the DDH-280 helicopter-destroyer by itself without 
ground-to-air support, would prove highly ineffectual in performing 
a coastal surveillance function. Also, the outdated but reliable 
Argus long range patrol aircraft needed to be replaced by a faster 
prototype that could cover greater distances in shorter periods of 
time. For details see Colin Gray, Op. cit., pp. 134-135. 
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Defence White Paper reversed this alignment and reordered Canada's 
defence commitments by building from the centre core to the outside 
rather than building from the outside into the centre core. Europe would 
no longer be considered as Canada's first line of defence. 
As a result, NORAD assumed new importance in Canadian defence policy 
because it enabled Canada's armed forces to carry out the surveillance 
of Canadian territories and continue its detection role in NORAD thereby 
95 protecting the U.S. deterrent. Although NATO seemed to be downplayed 
in favour of the NORAD Alliance, the Trudeau government continued to 
value its NATO membership for political and economic reasons rather than 
96 
military ones. 
The question of Canadian independence in respect to continuing its 
commitment to the NATO/NORAD Alliance systems has proven to be both 
superficial and misleading when it is discussed in a general systems 
context. Since Canada is not a dominant part in the international system 
like the United States or the Soviet Union, she must adapt to changes in 
the external environment that are not of her own choosing. 
However, this situation of natural dependency upon the actions of 
the superpowers differs from the previous periods of dependence and 
interdependence in Canada's history. 
" . . . Canadian authorities are now less pre-
occupied than before with the Pearsonian problem of 
stable 'systems maintenance' per se, and more 
Canadian interests from system interactions . . , 
they are less concerned with contributing to the 
conditions of peaceful diplomatic exchange than 
with the substance of the exchange itself.""7 
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Canadian decision makers no longer perceive Canada's role as being 
that of a "system maintainer" but rather visualize themselves only as one 
more actor within the international system with specific national 
interests to protect. 
From this perception comes the realization that Canadian 
'independence' to any degree can only be found in already existing inter-
dependent relationships such as the NATO/NORAD Alliances. Canadian 
defence critic John McLin argues that a nation can only have as much 
influence upon the structure and the military and political policies of 
98 
any alliance as it is willing to contribute to the alliance militarily. 
It may seem ironic, but Canada's continued participation in the NATO/NORAD 
Alliance systems may be the one commitment that keeps it from being force 
99 into a greater dependency upon the United States. 
Furthermore, there have been other recent developments in the 
international system that would seem to indicate increased Canadian 
reliance on strengthening this relationship with the United States. The 
multipolarity prevalent in the international system has given way to a 
new type of realignment among nations. The establishment of the 
European trading blocs, Britain's entry into the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the movement of the United Nations towards bipartisan-
ship such as the General Assembly's condemnation of Zionism, has created 
a situation that may speed up the natural process of integration 
J. McLin, Op. cit., p. 214. 
Ironic in the sense that Prime Minister Trudeau acknowledged in early 
1969 that the NATO/NORAD Alliances had constituted all of Canada's 
foreign policy since 1945. For the Prime Minister, it was a false 
perspective to have a military policy determining Canada's foreign 
policy. Yet, Canada's continued participation in the NATO/NORAD 
Alliance systems remains the focal point of her foreign policy. 
57. 
occurring between Canada and the United States. 
But there is an obvious danger in Canada continuing to rely upon the 
U.S. deterrent capability for mutual deterrence. It is conceivable that 
mutual deterrence could break down again,as it did during the Cuban 
missile crisis in October 1962. 
101 
The defence of Canada is solely the responsibility of Canadians. 
Although collective security agreements can be established to assist in 
the defence of Canada, they offer very few guarantees that assistance 
will be given when needed. French President Charles DeGaulle understood 
that the United States' nuclear deterrent by itself could not guarantee 
France's sovereignty. As a result, France withdrew from NATO in 1969 
and created her own independent form of nuclear deterrence - 'Force 
de Frappe' thereby placing the responsibility for France's defence in 
French hands. The combination of this independent nuclear deterrent and 
certain American guarantees of sovereignty has allowed France a type of 
freedom of action that she did not enjoy previous to 1969. 
France was able to capitalize on certain strategic conditions 
such as her focal geographic position in the NATO Alliance. When she 
decided to quit NATO in 1969, she left being fully aware that she 
still sat beneath the United States nuclear umbrella. This action is 
A closer look at the voting patterns in the United Nations seems to bear 
this fact out. In the early fifties the United States tended to dominate 
the General Assembly. In the early sixties the Soviet Union and the 
United States seemed to share in their domination of the United Nations. 
Today, United Nations voting behaviour is no longer dominated by the 
two superpowers but rather an alliance of voting third world nations 
has changed UN voting behaviour drastically. 
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Former U.S. President Richard Nixon reminded Canadians that their 
security is ultimately their personal responsibility. Refer back to 
Nixon Doctrine, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future" 
Op. cit. , p. 7. 
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significant if viewed in its general systems context. Although the initial 
conditions of existence for every nation state system influence final 
outcomes, they do not determine those final outcomes. 
France, having developed certain policy objectives that em-
phasized increased self-sufficiency, acted on those objectives and altered 
the initial conditions of her existence to such an extent as to assume a 
new and different equifinal position. 
Canada, having a different set of initial conditions can respond 
in similar ways but defence policy objectives must be established that 
reflect certain political realities. 
Summary 
Canada's defence policy has progressed through three stages of 
historical development, namely a period of dependence, a period of 
interdependence and a present period of relative independence. This 
historical development can be explained in general systems theory as 
the ongoing movement within every living open system towards a higher 
level of differentiated existence. 
However, every movement towards increased differentiation and 
progressive individualization is opposed by a counter movement to 
return the system to a previous level of dependence. Canada's defence 
policy has fluctuated between these two counter movements. There are 
many recommendations that can be made regarding the future of Canada's 
defence policy. The following chapter offers certain recommendations 
which are based upon significant political and technological considerations. 
CHAPTER III 
A Future For Canadian Defence Policy ? 
Prefacing Remarks: 
The purpose of defence policy analysis is to make predictions about 
the future based upon both a knowledge of the past and present. In this 
chapter, the future of Canada's defence policy is considered in a political, 
military, and strategic continuum. It is with an understanding of this 
prevailing continuum that recommendations on Canadian defence policy are 
made. 
(1) The Basic Incompatibility of Soviet 
Communism and Western Liberal Democracy 
In all open living systems, competition between system parts for 
1 
dominance leads to conflict. In the international political system, there 
is intense competition between two differing ideological systems for dominance. 
These two differing political systems are the Marxist - Communist political 
system as represented by the Soviet Union and the Western Liberal Democratic 
system as represented by the United States of America. 
The essential differences between these two opposing ideological systems 
and their basic antithetical incompatibility can be more 
fully understood by comparing their respective attitudes toward the individual, 
the concept of property, and the role of conflict in history. 
Both Soviet Marxism and Liberal Democratic thought are 
philosophically grounded in the individual and the role that he should 
play in political society. The Marxist Communist holds the view that 
the values and political objectives of Marxism-Leninism and Western 
Capitalism are totally incompatible with each other. For the Marxist-
L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . , Op. cit., p. 66. Von 
Bertalanffy observed in nature that competition, 'the struggle between the 
parts' eventually leads to the extermination of the species with the 
smaller growth capacity. 
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Leninist, Western Capitalism is an outmoded structure doomed to collapse 
2 in the path of world socialism. 
This point of view represents much more than just a verbal exercise 
in polemics. The Marxist-Leninist ideology is both rigidly dogmatic and 
highly methodical in its political doctrine and military policy. 
Marxism-Leninism has successfully been able to split the individual's 
life-property relationship by placing the ownership of all property in 
the collective hands of the state. 
Liberal democratic thought, on the other hand, holds the individual's 
life-property relationship in reverence by making it the focal point of 
individual existence. In liberal democratic philosophy, every individual 
has a basic inherent right to own property in support of his life. 
"For each man has a right to his preservation 
and hence to appropriating the necessities 
of his life."3 
The importance of the individual's right to the ownership of 
property in liberal democratic societies cannot be underestimated. 
Property and the proper use of it sustains life. The removal of property 
and the individual's right to its use threatens his continued existence. 
Therefore, one must realize as the Marxist-Leninists have, that to have 
property is to have power. 
Although Marxism-Communism regards the individual possession of 
property in its most negative, exploitive sense, the possession and use 
2 
Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, Third edition, 
edited with an analysis and commentary by H.F. Scott, New York: Crane, 
Russak Publishing Co., 1968, p. 16. 
3 
C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: 
Hobbes to Locke, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 142. 
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of property can offer many benefits that go well beyond the fulfillment of 
an individual's biological needs. For example, the possession of property 
by the individual gives him a sense of distinction, a separateness from 
his fellow men. For lack of a better term, the ownership of property can 
give man a personal type of freedom that sets him apart. 
"Not only has the individual a property in his 
person and capacities, a property in the sense 
of right to enjoy and use them and exclude others 
from them . . . . What makes man human is his 
freedom from other men. Man's essence is freedom. 
Freedom is the proprietorship of one's own person 
and capacities.1"^ 
Once an individual assumes effective possession of any part of the 
earth's bounty and puts it to his own personal use, he has then acquired 
both a property right and a corresponding right to exercise whatever 
power he has available to defend his property from others. For 
"Man hath by nature a Power . . . to preserve 
his property, that is his Life, Liberty and 
Estate."5 
The natural systemic competitiveness between various individuals 
in society to protect existing properties as well as acquire new properties 
creates a situation of potential conflict among men. As a result of this 
competitiveness leading to potential conflict, political society has grown 
out of the recognition of the necessity to orderly structure the defence 
of properties belonging to a large number of individuals. 
Ibid., p. 142. 
The individual right to property is important in a general systems 
context. One of the major isomorphic characteristics in general systems 
theory is progressive differentiation, the movement away from a more 
general and homogeneous state to a more specialized and heterogeneous 
condition of existence. L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . 
• • s Op. cit., p. 211. 
Ibid., p. 19 8. For original source, refer to Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
'Of Property' section 87. 
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"Society consists of relations of exchange between 
proprietors. Political society becomes a 
calculated device for the protection of this 
property and for the maintenance of an orderly 
relation of exchange. "° 
The opposing point of view to this interpretation of the life-
property relationship in liberal democratic philosophy infers that 
property ownership is a culturally learned characteristic rather than 
a biological necessity, 
"Private property is the child of culture and 
develops into a major pre-occupation only with 
the evolution of complex society. Allegiance 
to territory rather than one's kin is a 
relatively recent development in human history 
accompanying the invention of the state."7 
The Marxist-Leninist concept of private property is very similar 
to this point of view, however, property is thought of exclusively in 
Q 
terms of social class and economic relationships. Political society is 
composed of two antithetical forces, namely those who control the economic 
means of production (i.e. the bourgeois class) and those who have only 
their labour to contribute to that economic relationship (i.e. the 
proletariat class). 
For the Marxist-Communist, political society evolves from the 
perpetual conflict resulting from the struggle between these two anti-
thetical forces of economic existence. The liberal democrat, on the 
C.B. Macpherson, Op. cit., p. 3. From this point of view, one can infer 
that the function of defence is to protect individual property which 
sustains human life. 
A. Allard, The Human Imperative, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1972, p. 64. 
' In the words of Karl Marx, the theory of Communism is the abolition of 
private property. Refer to Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, The Communist 
Manifesto with Introduction by Leon Trotsky, New York: Pathfinder Press, 
1970, p. 28. 
other hand regards the evolution of political society more as a result 
9 
of social consensus rather than social conflict. 
While Marxism-Communism views human existence in the more negative 
context of conflict, democratic liberalism regards human existence in a 
positive sense. Competition between individuals and nation states is 
encouraged, any conflict resulting from this natural systemic 
competition is often regarded as unnatural and unhealthy. Herein lies 
the contradiction that liberal democracy has failed to see. 
In all open living systems, systemic competition over finite 
natural resources results in potential conflict between system parts. 
For 
"If a system does not permit 'conflict' it 
prevents adjustment thereby it maximizes the -
danger of catastrophic breakdown (spasm-war)." 
In Marxist-Communist doctrine, human conflict and the promotion 
of it is essential in the attainment of every Marxist's true finality, 
namely 'the socialist state'. The following basic principles flowing 
from conflict can be realized in Marxist-Communist ideology: 
Guidelines for Communist 
11 
Promotion of Conflict 
(a) War and Peace have no meaning or place in the Communist 
concept of the nation-in-arms. An unending struggle is 
9 
Jean Jacques Rousseau's Social Contract embodies the general belief in 
man's potential reason as indicated by the fact that a social consensus 
between individuals can be reached through common agreement. 
10 
N. Nyiri, Alternatives to Nuclear Warfare . . . . Vol. I, Op. cit., p. 
These guidelines have been adapted for this thesis from the unpublished 
manuscript of Lt. Col. D.G. Loomis, On Conflict, Ottawa: Dept. of 
National Defence, April 1st, 1969, pp. 308-309. 
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envisaged against counter-revolutionaries acting 
either within the state or outside of it. 
(b) Conflict is of a four-fold nature—diplomatic, economic, 
psychological and, as a last resort, military. It is 
possible to have many combinations of offense and defence 
in any or all of these spheres. 
(c) A Communist has no loyalty except to Communism. Thus, a 
Communist cannot be loyal to any nation, state, institution, 
or person save those nations, states, institutions, or 
persons which are Communist. For a Communist, the nation 
state is only a temporary stage of equifinal position 
along the road leading to the perfect socialist state. 
(d) To every revolution, there will be a counter-revolution. 
For every Communist, conflict is both an inevitable and 
desirable state of affairs. 
(e) Success in conflict is contingent on an alliance with the 
least privileged classes of society. Every society has 
variations of relative privilege. Thus, every society is 
vulnerable to Communism. 
(f) Always act offensively in as many spheres as possible. This 
principle is closely related to the next one. The ideal is 
a combined diplomatic, psychological, economic, and military 
offensive. In any case, offensive action in the diplomatic, 
economic, and psychological spheres cannot be successful 
unless a strong military potential exists. For this reason, 
the Soviet Union has continued to maintain large armed forces. 
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(g) All actions must be properly timed. In particular, the 
timing of offensive actions is governed by crisis. The 
most serious crisis for a Capitalistic state is an 
economic one. The second most serious is a military 
one. 
Although an economic crisis in a capitalist country works very 
much in favour of the Communists, economics is also 'the Achilles heel1 
of the Soviet system of government. The continued existence of liberal 
democracy based upon a free enterprise or market economy remains the 
major threat to World Communism. 
If the capitalist or free enterprise nations continue to lead the 
Communist nations in every conceivable economic standard of comparison, 
then the very basis of Communism will be threatened. For example, the 
military and technological advances of western democratic nations in 
the late fifties and early sixties were perceived as a very real threat 
to the continuation of Communism. 
"The military revolution came as a severe 
blow to Communist ideology: the Marxist 
thesis that capitalism was doomed because 
it had already exhausted all possibilities 
for effective development of productive 
forces was clearly disapproved by the 
discovery and adaptation in the capitalist 
camp of nuclear energy."12 
(h) Conflict is conducted by different means in different 
fields. This implies the well known principle of war-
flexibility. 
12„. Nikolai Galay "The Soviet Approach to the Modern Molitary Revolution" 
in John Erickson (ed.) The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Iiruoact 
on Strategy and Foreign Policy, New York: F.A. Praeger Publishers, 
1966, p. 20. 
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(i) Foreign policy and internal affairs of a Communist 
state must be closely related. A state's internal 
policies can be directed to bring about conditions 
that are favourable to the realization of that state's 
13 long term political objectives. 
Foreign policy, on the other hand, can be utilized in the prep-
aration for war by signing treaties, forming coalitions and safeguarding 
14 
the neutrality of neighbouring countries. 
For the Soviet Union, since conflict is considered to be inevitable, 
then all government policy must be directed in such a way as to ensure 
final victory. 
(j) The actions of one state must determine the actions of 
others. In non-Communist states this arises only 
indirectly through trade and commerce and sometimes 
military war. However, the nation-in-arms will always 
strive to influence the external and internal affairs 
of other states. 
(k) The overthrow of Capitalism is impossible without 
violence. Liberal Capitalism based upon market economy 
is recognized as the main threat to Communism. Other 
classes of opposition or counter-revolutionaries are 
recognized, but these may be overcome without violence 
or resorting to military action. Some examples are 
Middle East nationalism, Far East "neutralism" and so on. 
While an all-out nuclear holocaust is to be avoided, violence will 
13 
Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, Op. cit., p. II 
14, Ibid^, p. II 
still be required in the form of peaceful coexistence. 
"Peaceful coexistence by their (Soviet) definition 
means pursuing a vigorous policy of expanding 
their influence and power by any expedient means 
short of war. "•'•5 
In answer to the question on whether or not the values of Soviet 
Communism are compatible with those of liberal democratic nations, the 
reply must be an emphatic no. 
The values of Marxism-Communism are completely antithetical to the 
values of liberal democratic philosophy. While Communist ideology is 
grounded in both the inevitability and necessity for human conflict, 
western liberal democracies regard human conflict as being neither 
inevitable nor a desirable state of affairs. 
The following table of comparisons between the two ideological 
systems indicates the real degree of asymetry that exists on every 
practical level of analysis. 
Marxist-Leninist system 
limited "open" system 
FIGURE A-2 
Parts < Whole 
Liberal Democratic system 
an "open" system 
Parts > Whole 
cont'd 
15 
R. Garthoff "Military Power in Soviet Policy" in John Erickson (ed.) 
' Op. cit. , p. 239. 
con't 
Ideological Table of Comparisons 
Marxist-Leninist system Liberal Democratic system 
Ideological differences Ideological differences 
1. Life ^ property relationship 
severed (no private ownership of 
property allowed) 
Life = property relationship 
protected by law (private owner-
ship of property fully endorsed) 
2• Domination of Parts by the Whole 
System parts (individuals) inter-
relate to achieve objectives set 
by the whole (i.e. The Communist 
Party) 
Domination of Whole by the Parts 
individual parts interrelate to 
achieve objectives set by the parts. 
3. Status/ Encirclement by Capitalism 
makes defence necessary as Capitalism 
is both predatory and aggressive by 
nature^" 
Status/ Defence becomes necessary 
as Communism is hostile to the 
continuation of Capitalism 
4. Achievements/Defence of revolutionary 
gains: freedom from exploitation, 
slavery and poverty of Czarist Russia 
Achievements/Defence of democratic 
liberalism and its gains: liberty, 
equality, individual freedom and 
a high standard of living 
5• Sovereignty of the nation state 
Sovereignty of the Soviet Union 
considered essential: Integration 
with west would threaten Marxist 
ideology 
Sovereignty of the nation state 
Sovereignty of democratic states 
considered outdated. Global 
interdependence and integration 
sought as long range goal-'-7 
From these ideological differences comes the realization that liberal 
democratic nations like the United States and Canada have shown a 
dedication to strategies that promote stability, preservation of the 
status quo, and the balance of power rather than seeking conquest and 
1 8 
final solution through the methodical use of controlled conflict. 
16. 
17 
Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, Op. cit., p. 40. 
Ervin Laszlo, A Strategy for the Future . • Op. cit., p. 144. 
^Stefan Possony, J. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology: Winning the 
Decisive War, Cambridge, Mass.: University Press of Dunellen, 1970, p. 3. 
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On the other hand, the Soviet Union has shown it self to be true 
to Marxist-Leninist ideology by utilizing all of its national 
capabilities to promote conflict with the prospect of bringing about 
19 
the downfall of western democratic societies. It is in this perspect-
ive of understanding the purposes behind the Soviet military policy and 
learning from past Soviet behaviour that democratic nations respond with 
counter military strategies to offset any advantages that Soviet 
military strategy may have gained. Canada's contribution to western 
military strategy can be significant in countering Soviet military 
strategy. However, before counter strategies can be offered to challenge 
Soviet strategy, it is important that present American and Soviet military 
strategy be examined in light of military technology so that the strengths 
and weaknesses of each can be fully understood before endeavouring to 
make any recommendations on policy for Canada and western democratic 
nations in general. 
(2) U.S./Soviet Strategic Policy 
and Present Military Technology 
Although Von Clausewitz argued that it was misleading to' think 
that dependence on any one particular weapon by itself makes for a 
successful strategy, it is accepted fact that military technology and 
19 
Ibid., p. 3. 
If there is one thing that can be said about the past political 
behaviour of Soviet Communism, it would be that it has shown a high 
degree of consistency in regards to its commitment to Marxism-
Leninism. This has been an obvious advantage to the Communists but 
also it is a potential weakness worthy of exploitation. 
70. 
new weapons systems play a very leading role in shaping both the 
character of a nation's military strategy as well as influencing those 
policy options chosen. 
"Technology is dynamic, no one can agree to 
stand still. Force relationships change in 
the course of armament cycles despite the best 
planning possible . . . . New technologies 
create new power."20 
Every nation, no matter how large or how small, is affected by 
these new developments in weapons technology and the resultant policies 
that nations pursue in response to this technology. This has never been 
more evident than in the present nuclear age. 
In the early fifties, the Soviet Union found it self in a position 
of technical inferiority when it came to military technology. Although 
the Soviets possessed a large inventory of nuclear bombs of sufficient 
megatonnage, they lacked the necessary transport systems todeliver their 
nuclear payloads to North American shores. As an alternative to this 
deficiency, the Soviets resorted to building up large conventional forces 
in Europe with the purpose of holding United States' European allies 
21 hostage. 
In the latter part of the fifties and early sixties, the Soviet 
Union embarked on a crash program of offensive weapons development to 
lessen the technological gap that existed between themselves and the 
Americans. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were 
produced in sufficient numbers to make it possible for the Soviet 
Union to strike at American cities. At the same time as the Soviets were 
attempting to improve upon their inferior weapons position, the United 
20 
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit., p. 187. 
Morton Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy, Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1967, p. 57. 
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States had serious concerns about the escalating arms race 
and feared that it could lead to the outbreak of an all-out nuclear 
war. 
The strategic policy of the United States in the early sixties was 
22 
one of assured destruction. This was almost exclusively an offensive 
strategy in that the United States relied on its offensive capability to 
assure the destruction of some specified fraction of the population and 
industry of the potential enemy after the United States had absorbed the 
23 best blows the enemy could offer. 
This policy of assured destruction was a limited policy in that it 
offered no counter force capabilities to destroy the enemy's strike force 
and the American response to any threat was strictly a singular one, all 
out nuclear war. 
However, since the United States still enjoyed a comfortable 
weapons advantage over the Soviet Union due basically to its military 
technology, which had devised new types of nuclear missiles that were 
more accurate and more easily controlled in terms of damage limitation, 
the United States indicated a willingness to negotiate on arms limitation 
24 
with the Soviet Union. A general sophistication and refinement in 
nuclear weapons technology had made it possible to negotiate down from 
all-out nuclear war by introducing new partial strategies that.offered 
greater flexibility in response. 
In June of 1962, American Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
introduced his famous controlled flexible response strategy whereby the 
22 
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit., p. 111. 
23Ibid., p. 111. 
24 
Morton Halperin, Op. cit., p. 81. 
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United States would agree not to target its massive offensive nuclear 
capability on the heavily populated areas of the Soviet Union. It 
was the hope of the Kennedy administration that the Soviets would respond 
in kind, however the Soviet Union flatly rejected the American proposal 
because of its inferior technological position. 
In the latter part of the sixties and early seventies, the United 
States continued to indicate a willingness to negotiate with the Soviet 
Union on arms limitation but the Soviets displayed little interest in 
. . . . J 27 
limiting weapons development. 
Soviet strategic policy, on the other hand, has assumed a different 
approach than that of the Americans. The strategic policy of the Soviet 
9 8 
Union is a policy of assured survival and not assured destruction. 
This policy is explainable in that the Soviet Union, having been in an 
inferior technological position for a long period of time, conceded 
the United States a first strike capability but recognized that the United 
States had weaknesses in areas of active defence. 
The Soviet Union responded to this weakness by installing sub-
stantial defences and counterforce weapons to ensure that the United 
25 
Ibid., p. 77. 
Ibid., p. 85. 
27 
During the Nixon administration of 1968 and the Ford administration 
of 1974, United States authorities have talked of establishing a 
position of guaranteed parity or 'mutual equivalence1 with the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's failure to respond to such 
initiatives seems to be indicative of their attitude regarding the 
inevitability of conflict. For more details on U.S. negotiating 
stance, refer to Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger in his 
report to Congress: The Annual Defense Department Report for the 
Year 197 5, Washington: D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1974. 
o o 
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op, cit., p. 113. 
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States would be unable to destroy more than a portion of the Soviet 
29 Union and its satellite countries. 
In many ways, the Soviet strategy is a logical one. If the 
Soviet Union can continue to reduce the credibility of the U.S. 
assured destruction capability by increasing her active defence measures 
at home then the United States assured destruction capability could 
become a form of national suicide. 
In recent years, U.S. strategic policy has lost any flexibility 
it may have had. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, with its emphasis 
on survivability and improving her defensive capabilities may tend to 
dominate military strategy in the near future. For 
". . . the technical future, at least most 
immediately, clearly lies with greater 
accuracy, with defence, and with counter- „.. 
force capabilities (or at least potential)." 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union has certain other advantages in 
developing her military technology that the United States does not have. 
For example, the Soviets, unlike the Americans, have a very centralized 
or focalized approach for developing military technology and all 
technology in general. 
This is in part due to the strong reciprocal relationship between 
Soviet technology and those political objectives being sought by the 
Soviet Union. All aspects of Soviet life are made to conform to these 
29 
Ibid., p. 113. 
30 
Ibid., p. 114. 
31 
Desmond Ball "United States Strategic Doctrine and Policy - With Some 
Implications for Australia" in R. O'Neill (ed.) The Strategic Nuclear 
Balance: An Australian Perspective, Papers from the Conference at 
Strategic and Defence Studies Center Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1974, p. 42. 
74. 
political objectives. The Soviet economic system reflects this 
conformity. 
"The decisive advantage of the Soviet socialist 
state over the bourgeois states is the fact that 
the socialist structure assumes a more perfect 
economic organization of society; this is of 
decisive significance for the defensive power 
of a state."32 
North American democratic societies, on the other hand, tend to 
be dominated by the parts (i.e. individuals) rather than by the whole 
(i.e. the state). As a result, the approach to problem solving tends 
to be more varied and disseminated in the sense that greater variety and 
divergence seems to prevail. 
As stated in the previous section of this chapter, Soviet Communism 
regards conflict as an ongoing state of human affairs. Since 
conflict is inevitable then it is imperative that the Soviet Union per-
severe in any conflict situation. Technology and the mastery of It holds 
the key to Soviet attainment of this goal. 
As a result, the Soviet Union has focused a large proportion of 
her GNP (Gross National Product) on the development of heavy industry, 
33 
air defence, and maintaining large conventional ground forces. 
What this has meant for the Soviet Union is that certain sacrifices 
be made in areas of human need and consumer technology so that a techno-
logical advantage in weapons systems could be acquired. The United States, 
Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, Op. cit., p. 30. 
M. Halperin, Op. cit., p. 59. The Soviet Union, unlike the United 
States, regards defence policy decisions as not basically economic 
decisions but rather tends to regard them as political decisions. 
U.S. operational researchers and systems analysists often view U.S. 
policy options more in terms of cost effectiveness than objective 
effectiveness. For more details on United States defence policy 
planning see E.S. Quade, W. Boucher (eds.) Systems Analysis and 
Policy Planning Applications in Defence (New York: Elsevier Pub. 
Co., 1968), pp. 1-19 inclusive. 
having more economic resources than the Soviet Union, has tended to 
scatter her research and technological developments in various areas 
of human need to improve individual life styles. 
These different approaches to technology and its uses have created 
a legitimate concern about the future. 
"The point is despite the enormous western 
superiority in total quantity of technological 
resources, the USSR has been able to concentrate 
more effort than we have on selected portions 
of weapons technology and to gain local „, 
superiority in many phases of military technology." 
This situation works in the interests of Soviet Communism. The United 
States, being a 'capitalist bourgeois society' must be destroyed, thus 
ending the inevitable dilemma of comparisons between two ideological 
systems that are asymetrical to each other. 
Also, many in the west hold the view that technology can be halted 
35 by signing agreements and treaties. But this is a false 
perspective in the sense that technology may be slowed down but it never 
can be halted. To halt technology would mean to stop growth and develop-
ment which are two essential isomorphic characteristics visible to some 
j T n 1 • • • 3 6 
degree in all living organisms. 
A closer examination of the objectives of Soviet military policy 
indicates how comprehensive the Soviet threat is. The four 
basic objectives of Soviet military policy are built one upon the other 
to indicate a multi-tiered type of total strategy. These objectives are 
the following: 
(a) avoid nuclear war 
(b) build up mutual deterrence capability to offset 
34s. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit., p. 22. 
35Ibid., p. 26. 
36 
L. Von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development. . . . Op. cit. , p. 
76. 
U.S. nuclear capability 
(c) maintain a strong continental military position 
in Europe and Asia 
(d) the Soviet Union must continue to develop more mobile 
and versatile conventional forces, i.e. naval and 
maritime capabilities to support its interests in the 
Third World and to sustain its role as a global 
37 
competitor to the U.S. 
This is significant if one recalls that Communism refers to flexibility 
or the ability to act offensively in as many spheres as possible at all 
O Q 
times, as being one of the principal guidelines for promoting conflict. 
In recent years, the Soviet Union has embarked on an impressive 
type of 'Blue Water Strategy' whereby its naval forces have been expanded 
to act as an instrument for the global support of Soviet interests rather 
39 
than as merely an adjunct to Soviet land power. 
This development should not be underestimated in its importance for 
in the present era of strategic nuclear deterrence,control of the world's 
oceans could alter existing world political strategy and disturb economic 
40 
and social conditions in Third World countries. 
To meet this Soviet threat, it is essential that western democratic 
37 
Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1970, p. 428. 
38 
Lt. Gen. D.G. Loomis, Op. cit., p. 309. 
39 
Thomas Wolfe, Op. cit., p. 442. The Soviet merchant marine has been 
expanded in recent years to complement her already impressive navy. 
40 
General A. Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow with introduction by 
R. Foster, New York: Crane, Russat and Co., 1974, p. 65. 
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nations such as the United States and Canada devise a total strategy 
that is capable of covering not merely the phenomenon of the nuclear 
weapon and its possible successors (outer-space, biological warfare etc.) 
41 but also the more limited problems of indirect warfare. 
Nothing less than a total strategy will suffice in the present 
era of nuclear technology. Nuclear weapons are total weapons; total in 
their effect and total in the effort required to sophisticate them and 
maintain them. 
In the previous period of conventional weapons, the quantity of 
weapons and not necessarily the quality of the weapon used often turned 
the course of battle. An enemy could be overcome by the sheer force of 
numbers. 
In the present nuclear age, weapons numbers, although still 
significant, have given way to other equally crucial considerations such 
as the quality of weapon systems being used and their survivability 
42 
under conditions of attack. 
Presently, military technology and subsequently military strategy 
is being revolutionized by the use of the computer. Computer technology 
is bringing strange and highly complex weapon systems out of the pages 
"General A. Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy With Particular 
Reference to Problems of Defence, Politics, Economics and Diplomacy 
in the Nuclear Age, translated by Major General R.H. Barry with 
preface by B.H. Liddell Hart, London: Faber and Faber Publishing 
Co., 1966, p. 99. 
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op_L_cvti_, p. 10. 
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of science fiction and applying them in the global battlefield. 
Total weapons require total strategies from nations that hope to 
control their use and not to be controlled by them. It is in this 
context of a total weapon requiring a total strategy that Canada's 
defence policy can play a vital role in defending Canada from her 
enemies and contributing to the defence of the western world. 
( 3) Recommendations in Canadian Defence Policy 
Since the prevailing military technology significantly affects 
the determination of viable defence policy options, a nation must bring 
its defence policy in line with both this prevailing military technology 
as well as those general political objectives being sought by the nation 
as a whole. 
As stated previously in chapter one, finalities (i.e. political 
objectives) play a very significant part in the behavioural activity of 
all open living systems. Although the behavioural activity of all 
open living systems is both naturally purposive and goal directed, man's 
43 
For example, the United States is experimenting with computer 
operated bombers which can fly long range bombing missions without 
requiring any type of human intervention. Also, the United States 
army has designed a lightweight laser gun that enables individual 
battlefield soldiers to hit and destroy their target from one mile 
away. Although these advances along with numerous others of 
varying complexity seem bizarre to a conventional war mentality, 
they do exist and thus become a part of the military strategy of 
the nations that possess them. For more details on computer 
weaponry, refer to Phil Stanford "The Global Automated Battlefield" 
in D. Johnson, B. Schneider (eds.) Current Issues in U.S. Defence 
Policy, Center for Defense Information, New York: Praeger Publishing 
Co., 1976, pp. 202-207 inclusive. 
79. 
social systems allow for the possibility of human intervention and 
the superimposition of new finalities on top of nature's pre-existing 
ones. 
If a nation's defence policy and subsequently its foreign policy 
do no more than respond to changes in weapon system technologies then 
over time such stimulus-response behaviour will prove to be both costly 
and ineffective. This is a problem of organization, or more specific-
ally, a lack of it. 
For too long, Canada's defence policy has assumed an 'ad hoc' jJ^ *-
44 
nature in responding to conflict situations after they have occurred. 
In general systems theory, this type of system behaviour results from 
a lack of foresight of the goal sought by the dominant system parts, 
namely its decision makers. 
(a) A National Security Policy for Canada 
At present, Canada lacks a national security policy which could 
be directed towards creating a unified and harmonious Canadian society 
45 
and assisting in minimizing the potential for conflict in the world. 
A national security policy would be more relevant than reaffirming often 
ambiguous and ill-defined political objectives in a defence policy 
review which is done every four or five years. 
It would involve devising a total technological strategy to draw 
upon every aspect of Canadian life. The major objectives of such a 
44 
Lt. Col. D.G. Loomis, On Conflict . . . . Op. cit., p. 255. 
45Ibid., p. 256. 
Denis Stairs, "The Military as an Instrument . . . ," Loc. cit., p. 87. 
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national security policy would be threefold in approach; 
(i) To prevent war - Canada would continue to uphold 
existing mutual deterrence responsibilities in the 
48 
NATO/NORAD Alliances. However, Canada would be 
required to field modern armed forces with modern 
49 high energy weapons. 
(•"-*•) To devise a national indirect strategy - This 
is a multi-faceted approach to 'legitimize' the 
defence of Canada by making Canadians aware of 
it. This would be done by the creation of various 
government policies to inform the Canadian public 
about the facts of modern war and conflict with 
the purpose of strengthening the Canadian will 
47 General headings adapted from General A. Beaufre, Deterrence and 
Strategy . . . . Op. cit., p. 127. 
48 
It is no longer a question of whether or not Canada should remain 
in these two alliance systems because they have succeeded in keeping 
the peace for the last two decades. But rather the questions involv-
ing Canada's continuing contributions to the NATO/NORAD Alliances 
relates to questions of logistics, namely what force levels should 
be maintained, what roles and missions performed and the geographic 
distribution of resources. For more details refer to Lt. Col. D.G. 
Loomis, Op. cit., p. 267. 
49 
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit., p. 6. It is no longer sufficient 
to rely on mass mobilization as in previous World Wars. Present 
military technology does not allow sufficient time for a nation to 
mobilize. Canada must maintain sufficient conventional forces to 
ensure against a surprise action. Sufficient conventional forces 
does not infer large numbers but rather a superior fighting force 
equipped with the most up-to-date weapons. 
to resis 
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Educational programs should be instituted to 
educate the Canadian public on the value in having 
a truly 'professional' armed forces. Hopefully, 
such programs would restore a sense of self identity 
and a professional 'esprit de corps' within the 
rank and file of Canada's armed forces, 
(ill) To win the war - This would involve the development 
of a highly sophisticated and modern technological 
base that would be capable of providing Canada's 
armed forces with multi-level support in both 
weapons and other technical support. This 
Herman Kahn has made the interesting observation that after the first 
use of nuclear weapons against the west, there is likely to be 'a 
shock reaction' among western populations. Although the damage may 
only be limited, the citizenry, unaccustomed to such damage may 
tend to exaggerate the damage impact. This 'shock reaction' 
combined with a general lack of public knowledge of what options 
of counter-attack are available may pressure western leaders to 
negotiate for peace. The national will to resist is at its 
strongest when there is an informed public. For more details on 
Kahn's argument, see Brig. Gen. D.G. Loomis, "Reorganization on 
Basis of a Total Force Concept" in Canadian Defence Quarterly 
Vol. V #3 Winter 1975/76, p. 14. 
Since the Second World War, the Canadian military has suffered from 
problems of poor morale and a high rate of attrition as a result of 
not being able to establish a self identity and personal relevance 
in Canadian society. The primary nature of defensive activity has 
not been given the significant position among government policies 
that it deserves. Hopefully, future research in defence policy 
will concern itself with developing a general theory of defence. 
For more details on the military's search for recognition, see 
R.B. Byers, Colin Gray, Canadian Military Professionalism: The 
Search for Identity, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1973. 
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recommendation could be perceived by the Canadian 
government as being a sensitive one since it 
relates to the possible resurrection of a viable 
52 defence production industry in Canada. 
An objective analysis of Canada's weapons 
requirements combined with an appreciation of what 
roles and capabilities she best performs is required 
so that Canadian industry can be utilized to produce 
those weapons most suitable to performing Canada's 
defence roles. It is questionable that a country 
such as Canada, with one of the highest GNPs should 
continue to make the lowest contribution of that 
GNPfor such a primary task as defence. 
Defence production in Canada is a highly sensitive political issue. 
Its ramifications cut across the breadth of Canadian economic life. 
Since Canada signed the Defence Production Sharing Agreement in 
1958-1963, she has found herself in an unusual economic relation-
ship with her partner, the United States. At present, various 
Canadian industries (e.g. the electronics industry) build component 
parts for American weapon systems, selling those component parts to 
the United States and then turning around and buying back the 
finished product to fulfil Canada's defence commitments. It seems 
that for every Canadian dollar made on the sale of component parts 
to the United States, two or more dollars are spent by the Canadian 
government to buy back a finished product that the Canadian govern-
ment had initially financed to build. It may be more economically 
and socially feasible if these Canadian defence dollars were spent 
in Canada to finance Canadian defence production industries, there-
by creating new jobs for Canada's unemployed. For more details 
on defence production sharing, refer to A. Axline (ed.) Continental 
Community: Independence and Integration in North America, Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1974, pp. 116-135. 
83. 
53 (b) Strategic Re-Organization and a Total Force Concept 
Although it would be advantageous for Canada to have a national 
security policy, it would be of little value unless some form of 
organizational structure existed to turn political and military 
objectives into operational policy. As stated earlier, organization 
is the essence of all life. 
However, any organization is of little value unless that organ-
ization is directed towards those desired goals selected by the 
dominant parts of the system. If there is a lack of foresight or some 
confusion exists as to what those goals or objectives are, then as is 
often the case in large organizations, organizational structure can 
54 
motivate the day—to-day activity of such organizations. 
Since large organizations such as defence establishments are 
composed of individual members, these individuals naturally bring their 
own goals and objectives to the organization. 
"The specificity and grouping of such individuals 
assumes a finality, as they do of every group 
of people which tries to find the conditions 
necessary for survival."55 
As a result, the component parts of the organization become pre-
occupied with questions of form such as organizational structure while 
53 
The total force concept is adapted from the article by Brig. General 
D.G. Loomis, "Reorganization on Basis of a Total Force Concept", 
Op. cit. , pp. 1-14. 
54 
L. Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory . . . . , Op. cit., p. 7 8. 
55 
J.P. Moreigne, "Military Management: A Fantasm or a Necessity?" in 
M.R. Van Gils (ed.) The Perceived Role of the Military, Rotterdam 
University Press, 1971, p. 237. 
questions of policy and substance tend to become a secondary .concern. 
If the dominant parts of the system (i.e. the political decision 
makers) do not exercise sufficient control and direction over the system 
parts (i.e. government departments, committees, subcommittees etc.) then 
the essential continuity between intent of an action, the idea motivating 
it, the form taken to administer it and the action itself, is severed 
by this lack of control. 
In the Department of National Defence, certain technical respons-
ibilities could be more clearly differentiated from each other and 
reclassified. For example, it has been recommended that the task of 
strategic analysis be further subdivided into strategic planning and 
56 
strategic control. Strategic planning would involve the scientist, 
technologist, and political theorist wading through the complicated 
scientific and technical jargon of military technology with the purpose 
of making recommendations on policy. This process of strategic planning 
would be open to all elements of Canadian society to contribute in making 
57 
a truly national defence policy. (See Figure A-3.) 
However, defence policy is much more than merely a series of 
responses to changes in initial conditions, be they strategic or technol-
ogical in nature. A nation's defence policy is a political issue as well 
The political aspect of defence policy planning relates to the.need for 
! 5 8 
strategic control. 
Lt. General D.G. Loomis, On Conflict . . . . , Op. cit., pp. 256-257, 
57 
Ibid., p. 257. 
Ibid., p. 258. 
FIGURE A-3: 
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Reproduced from S. Possony, J. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology 
. . , Op. cit. , p. 60. 
When all available information has been gathered, analyzed and 
policy recommendations have been made, political authority must be 
exercised to turn recommendations into operational policy. 
Today, unlike ever before, the demands on a political decision 
maker's time and competency are extremely great. In matters of military 
strategy, he must be capable of transcending the immediate concerns 
of logistics which tend to prevail yet be able to see all the possible 
59 futures that technology and the technologists will thrust upon him. 
He must be a generalist who is both capable of understanding the 
nuances involved in issues of particular interest while understanding 
those same issues in the totality of all things. At the best of times, 
this description is one of an extraordinary man. 
The awesome nature of this responsibility combined with the fact 
that Canada's political decision makers have indicated an aversion 
towards the politically sensitive problem of defence , it is recommend-
ed that a National Defence Council of Canada (NDCC) or a Security Council 
of Canada (SCC) be established along the lines of its American counter-
part, the National Security Council. (Refer to Figure A-4.) 
The NDCC or SCC would shift the singular burden of responsibility f 
defence from the shoulders of a political decision maker with partisan 
interests to the collective shoulders of high ranking decision makers 
(i.e. parliamentary leaders), strategists, and scientists alike. To 
avoid the problem of political partisanship, the NDCC or SCC would be 
responsible to Parliament in general and not just to the government in 
power. 
These recommendations for change in those organizations responsible 
for making defence policy, administering it, and analyzing its possible 
59 
S. Possony, J. Pournelle, Op. cit. , pp. 88-89. 
N. Nyiri, Alternatives to Nuclear Warfare . . . , Occasional Paper 
#2, Op. cit., p. 460. 
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Reproduced from Lt. Col, D. G. Loomis, On Conflict, unpublished manuscript, Canada. 
Department of National Defence, Ottawa: April 1, 1969, p. 260. 
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weaknesses will not, by themselves, constitute a successful defence 
policy. As stated previously in chapter one, defensive activity as a 
primary function of all open living systems occurs on all hierarchial 
levels. 
Defence of the sovereign nation state must be regarded by western 
democratic nations as a total system activity requiring a total system 
response. Mass mobilization of a national population and the Napoleonic 
concept of the 'Levee en masse' are outmoded in the present weapons age 
where response time is a matter of minutes if not seconds. 
A military technology of total weapons requires both a response 
in terms of a total strategy and a total force. 
"The concept of a total force embodies the 
idea of generating military forces in a 
number of pre-planned stages to meet various 
levels of emergency. "°1 
The total force concept is a radically new idea in the history of 
military strategy. It does not mean having numerically large armed 
forces but rather a well equipped, well organized armed forces capable 
, • , . . . . . 62 
of responding by stages to any given crisis situation. 
However, a national militia by itself without a civilian support 
counterpart does not constitute a total force. 
"To meet the requirements for these new dynamic 
organizations in an economic and safe fashion 
a mobilization base is required within our 
society which includes not only that traditional ,_ 
militia but also its equivalent civil components." 
61 
Brig. General D.G. Loomis, "Re-organization on Basis of a Total Force 
Concept . . . ," Op. cit. , p. 9. 
62Ibid. , p. 9. 
63 
Lt. General D.G. Loomis, Op. cit., p. 282. 
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To organize Canada's armed forces along the lines of a total force 
concept would require categorizing the type of potential conflict that could 
occur between situations of absolute peace and total war and then responding 
to each corresponding threat with the appropriate force commitment. ( See 
Figure A-5.) This represents a marked departure from the previous home 
defence commitment of earlier Canadian governments that regarded "the defence 
64 
of Canada and Western Europe as ultimately one operation." 
A major advantage of the total force concept is that it offers a 
certain degree of flexible response. Also, total force could prove 
to be an economical system of organization capable of coping with 
internal and external conflict situations as well as providing a sense 
of self identity for Canada's armed forces. 
(4) Summary 
The future of Canada's defence policy will very much be dependent 
on international political and strategic conditions that will not be 
of her own choosing. At present, two antithetical political systems, 
Soviet Communism and Western Liberal Democracy are in constant competition 
with each other for systems dominance. 
While Soviet Communism is philosophically committed to the promotion 
of conflict, western liberal democracies regard social consensus as a 
more desirable state of human affairs. 
64 
The Honourable Brooke Claxton, Canada s Defence Programme, Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1949, p. 12. 
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The natural competition between these two dominant system parts 
has extended into military and weapons technology. Under these 
international conditions, Canada's defence policy must develop a 
national security policy that would work towards controlling the out-
break of conflict on whatever level it may occur. Also, a national 
security organization with the responsibility to develop defence policy 
options should be established. 
In the present era of total weapons, Canada must develop both a 
total strategy and a total force to provide for the direct and indirect 
defence of Canada. 
CHAPTER IV 
Observations and Conclusions 
Observations 
Most of the present research being done in Canadian defence 
policy has tended to be both partial in nature and singular in approach. 
Few attempts have been made to study the problem of Canadian defence 
policy on a higher level of analysis. 
What seems to be warranted is a theoretical inquiry that would 
conceivably explain existing phenomena and offer recommendations for 
change based upon these observations. As well, a theoretical inquiry 
would be required to obey certain basic principles for conducting a 
truly scientific analysis. 
General systems theory is the type of analytical theory that 
closely approximates the objective of attaining the highest level of 
inquiry while still remaining firmly grounded in the pure sciences. 
In general systems theory, all living open systems situated on the 
various levels of nature's hierarchy display certain isomorphic character-
istics that they hold in common with each other. 
Many of these reoccuring characteristics are antithetical to 
each other. This is representative of the basic duality that exists 
everywhere in nature. For example, the characteristics of progressive 
centralization and progressive individualization, competition of parts 
Taylor, A.M., "Evolution-Revolution, General Systems Theory and Society" 
in R. Gotesky, E. Laszlo (eds.) Evolution-Revolution, New York: Gordon 
and Breach Publishing Co., 1971, p. 111. 
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and domination of parts, entropy and negentropy, anabolism and catabolism 
in general systems theory are indicative of this basic duality in nature. 
Secondly, the other basic principle derived from general systems 
theory is that organization is the essence of all life. No living open 
system is totally self-sufficient. Instead, every living open system 
can acquire a relative degree of self-sufficiency or independence by 
competing for systems dominance with the other parts of the system. 
Increased independence of action is only possible through increased 
interdependence. 
Also, the purpose or 'true finality' of every living open system 
is to ensure its survival by maintaining itself and its identity. As a 
result of the system's true finality, the defensive activities of every 
living open system are directed in such a way as to be directly support-
ive of this purpose. 
With all living open systems, the interaction of system parts 
results in competition within systems and between particular systems 
for those finite system properties that sustain life. This natural 
competitiveness gives rise to conditions that are conducive, for 
creating potential conflict between system parts. 
From these general systems observations, it is possible to draw 
certain basic conclusions regarding defence as a total system activity 
and defence policy as a total system response. 
Conclusions 
The function of all defensive activity in the nation state 
system is motivated by the desire to control the potential conflict 
arising from the natural competitiveness occurring within that 
91. 
particular nation state system and between competing nation state 
systems. 
More specifically, a nation state's defence policy is a rational 
response by that nation's political authorities to control the conflict 
resulting from the natural competitiveness of open systems thus main-
taining that political system in its entirety. Defence establishments 
are merely the organizational means by which the potential for conflict 
can be 'professionalized' as to make final victory possible. 
In the international political system, the two antithetical political 
forces of Marxist Communism and Western Liberal Democracy compete with 
each other for systems dominance. As is characteristic in the basic dualism 
of nature, Soviet Communism and Western Liberal Democracy are completely 
antithetical to each other. 
Soviet Communism regards conflict and the promotion of conflict 
as an inevitable and desirable state of human affairs. Liberal democracy, 
on the other hand, regards social consensus and not conflict as more 
indicative of the human condition. 
As a result of these two essential differences, Communist nations 
and western democratic nations have responded according to their respect-
ive beliefs. In the Soviet Union, defence assumes a focal position in 
Soviet life. It has become a total system activity requiring a total 
system response. 
Soviet military strategy reflects this primary concern with 
defending the Soviet Union by having developed a highly comprehensive yet 
flexible total strategy. It. is flexible in the sense that it operates 
at all times in as many spheres of potential conflict as possible. 
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Furthermore, the Soviet Union has adopted a total system strategy 
whereby all aspects of Soviet life are considered to be supportive of 
its political and ideological ambitions. Defence policy decisions are 
inherently political decisions and not primarily decisions of cost 
effectiveness and economic feasibility. Western liberal democratic nations 
such as the United States and Canada represent the opposing position in 
this aspect of nature's duality. 
Defence has not been elevated to a primary function of the nation 
state system in democratic societies as is the case in Marxist Communist 
countries. Defence is not seen in its fullest system's context as being 
a total system activity requiring a total system response. 
In the past, western democratic nations have reacted to threats 
and crises with graduated responses to bring about a resolution of 
conflict. Although, when these responses were grouped together to 
constitute an overall strategy, they were highly summative in nature. 
Seldom have western strategists viewed the threat of Soviet Communism 
in its totality. 
If this were to be done, then western military strategy in the 
future would no longer consist of a series of responses built one upon another 
but rather be comprised of a series of responses built in a constitutive 
sense with the realization that the Soviet Communist threat is a total 
systems one. 
This is understandable since conflict is not accepted in western 
democratic societies as being an inevitable ongoing process but rather 
it is considered as a temporary condition brought on either by a breakdown 
in international communication or a failure to adequately reach a social 
consensus. 
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While western military strategy has given the appearance of flexible 
response to the Soviet nuclear challenge, this has been true more in 
principle than in fact. 
The lack of flexibility in western military strategy can be 
accounted for by the tendency in western democratic nations to regard 
defence policy decisions more as economic decisions than as political 
decisions relating to continued survival. 
In most western democratic nations, limited national resources are 
provided for respective military establishments to carry out the variety 
of tasks required to successfully challenge the Soviet Communist threat 
which eclipses all spheres of potential conflict. As a result, certain 
areas of the west's potential counter-response to the more comprehensive 
and flexible Soviet Communist challenge is not completely adequate. 
Furthermore, the present development of sophisticated military 
technology has broadened the scope of potential technological response 
rather than limiting basic response capabilities. The nuclear weapon 
combined with computer technology has revolutionized military strategic 
thinking. The greater availability of military technology has encouraged 
all competing parties to utilize that military technology to gain an 
advantage. 
Western democratic nations, limited by available funding, have 
specialized their activities in certain areas to gain partial advantages. 
However, partial advantages may prove to be insufficient in the broader 
aspect of the west attaining final victory. 
It is in this perspective that Canada pursue a defence policy 
that is both credible in terms of contributing to western military 
strategy as well as being meaningful for a critical Canadian public. 
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The Canadian dilemma has been one of attaining sufficient 
independence or freedom of action in a situation of systems 
interdependence with the United States. 
This is a common dilemma found in all living open systems. As 
stated previously, organization is the essence of all life. No living 
open system can be totally self-sufficient or independent from other 
living open systems. 
However, a degree of relative independence is possible within 
a situation of interdependence. Since there is continuous competition 
between system parts for systems dominance, it is logical to infer from 
this fact that Canada could acquire a significant degree of relative 
independence if she proceeded to play a more significant role in its 
existing interdependent relationships. 
For example, Canadian participation in NORAD could become more 
active by bolstering her present contributions in terms of force strength 
and strategic input. NORAD's jurisdiction could conceivably be extended 
to include much more than those problems relating to the air defence of 
North America. A revamped NORAD Alliance with a more active Canadian 
partner could make significant contributions to the west's total system 
strategy. 
Also, increased Canadian participation and a general willingness 
to initiate new ideas and new strategies would restore U.S. confidence 
in Canada's commitment to the defence of the west. 
On a national level, the defence of Canada should be considered 
as a total system activity and not as a partial system activity. Present 
political conditions combined, with new military technology requires a 
total system strategy. 
It will no longer be sufficient to make partial summative responses to the 
constitutive total system threat inherent in Soviet Communism, therefore 
Canada's defence policy must be elevated beyond being an infrequent crisis 
oriented activity to a position of primary importance in the list of government 
concerns. 
In regards to the use of general systems theory in social research, there 
are certain limitations that must be clearly spelled out. For example, the 
predictive capability of general systems theory is questioned on the same 
grounds like other theories in the social sciences with reference to their 
relative capability to make future predictions. 
More specifically, the question of entropy and negentropy have not been 
dequately resolved in the general literature due to the fact of incomplete 
•esearch into the nature and causes of disorder. However, bearing these 
.imitations in mind, there are no positive grounds for rejecting the utility 
ralue of general systems theory in providing a framework for explaining human 
•eality. 
The study of Canada's defence policy by the use of general systems theory 
.s only one aspect of this human reality, namely systems survival,.._.-.--
c - ~~ f 
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